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Book Reviews 
Tradition Counter Tradition: Love and the Form of Fiction by Joseph Allen 
Boone. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. x + 408. $27.50. 
In 1980, in "What Do Feminist Critics Want? Or A Postcard from the Vol-
cano" (ADE Bulletin 66: Winter 1980, 16-24), Sandra Gilbert addressed the 
chairmen of the Association of Departments of English, lamenting that men 
were not reading feminist criticism. Instead, feminist critics are "left to speak 
more and more to one another rather than to those of you 'out there' whose 
minds we passionately wish to reach" (p. 21). But scarcely a year later, Claire 
Pajaczkowska wrote in Screen (22:1 [1981]), "I am tired of men arguing 
amongst themselves as to who is the most feminist, frustrated by an object 
feminism becoming the stakes in a displaced rivalry between men because of 
a refusal by men to examine the structure of the relations between them-
selves." In Tradition Counter Tradition, Joseph Allen Boone is passionately 
engaged with feminist literary criticism, but he also examines the structure of 
relations between men in texts ranging from medieval love literature to Nor-
man Mailer's The Naked and the Dead. Boone writes as a male critic who 
wishes "neither to elide my own gender nor to reduce the centrality of femi-
nism to my critical practice" (p. 25). In addition to the now classic texts of 
feminist literature and criticism, his critical practice is informed by Mikhail 
Bakhtin's dialogic theory of the novel and by Peter Brooks' psychoanalytic 
analysis of narrative desire. Boone examines love, sexuality, and marriage as 
social ideologies which are perpetuated in narrative stru.ctures ranging from 
pre-Richardsonian novels to the present. This topic is the focus of Part One, 
"Tradition: Marital Ideology and Novelistic Form." In Part Two, he relates 
the dismantling of the ideology of marriage to the formal innovations in 
nineteenth and twentieth century British and American novels. 
Boone begins with an historical overview of the transformations in the in-
stitution and ideology of marriage dating from the courtly love tradition in 
the late eleventh century. From a discussion of the legacy of adultery on the 
Continent, he moves to the synthesis of love and marriage in Renaissance 
and Puritan England, and discusses the relationship between the rise of the 
middle class, the (so-called) "rise" of the novel, and the bourgeois ideal of 
companionate marriage in the eighteenth century. Throughout, he draws on 
Althusser's definition of ideology as a system of representations that consti-
tute the sphere of social relations into which each individual is fitted; he then 
links textual representation to the constructions of gender in the novelistic 
marriage tradition. While most literary historians tend to praise their particu-
lar epoch-whether Late Medieval, Renaissance, or the eighteenth century-
as bringing about the most revolutionary changes in sexual politicS, Boone 
argues that short-run innovations must be measured against larger transhis-
torical formations. One of the considerable values of.Boone's study is that by 
taking the long view, he exposes the fundamental conservatism of each ep-
och and of the novel as a genre, noting that "what is genuinely revolutioniz-
ing tends to get absorbed in the fabric of society, a process which the novel 
mimes" (p. 33). 
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Boone shows just how the novel mimes this process, noting that "the his-
tory of the English-language novel cannot really be separated from the his-
tory of the romantic wedlock ideal whose rise we have been tracing: the new 
genre gained its formal coherence in part by becoming the repository of the 
marital ethos increasingly cultivated among Protestant middle classes in En-
gland and America" (p. 65). He focuses on three paradigmatic plots: court-
ship, seduction, and wedlock, comparing Pamela and Pride and Prejudice in 
terms of courtship; Clarissa and Tess of the D'Urbervilles in terms of seduc-
tion; and Fielding's Amelia and Howells's A Modern Instance in terms of wed-
lock. In each chapter, the pairs of texts selected for detailed analysis are sup-
plemented by a discussion of less familiar works of the period; one is thus in-
formed about many more novels than are featured in the Table of Contents. I 
particularly liked the section on seduction, because without sentimentalizing 
Victimized Womanhood, Boone stresses the voyeurism that makes the reader 
complicit in the textual design of mastery and submission. Thus while novel-
ists like Richardson and Hardy lament their heroines' fates, they preserve the 
sexual values intrinsic to patriarchal order and participate in lithe ideological 
indoctrination common to the novelistic marriage tradition" (p. 130). 
The second part, on "Counter-tradition: Demonstrations in Form Break-
ing," is even more interesting than Part One, for here Boone discusses novels 
whose formal innovations are a means of subverting the myth of the happy 
marriage, induding Wuthering Heights, Daniel Deronda, The Golden Bowl, and 
To the Lighthouse. These juxtapositions yield provocative and original insights 
into Catherine Linton's desire and destruction, Daniel Deronda's destiny, 
Maggie Verver's calculated manipulation of both adulterous spouses and nar-
rative resolutions; and Virginia Woolf's modernist dismantling of the Vic-
torian marriage ideal and the conventions of realism. Marriage in these nov-
els is a battle, an interior emptiness, a psychological constriction, mirrored in 
narrative experiments in "writing beyond the ending of the traditional love-
plot" (p. 224). These texts, Boone argues, have the potential to be revolution-
ary, since by exposing the alienating effects of uneasy wedlock, they reshape 
the dynamics of narrative desire. Revolutionary potential, however, is not the 
same thing as revolution. Like Peter Brooks in Reading for the Plot: Design and 
Intention in Narrative, Boone occasionally elides the difference. Again like 
Brooks, Boone tends to avoid the more radical implications of Derridean 
post-structuralism regarding being and identity, and of Lacanian psychoanal-
ysis regarding desire and the linguistic construction of the subject. But 
Boone's debt to Brooks does not prevent him from cogently critiquing Brooks 
(as well as Terry Eagleton) for hypothesizing a male reader; the pattern of 
narrative desire they evoke "follows a linear model of sexual excitation and 
final discharge most often associated, in both psychological and physiological 
terms, with men ... [thus 1 fostering the illusion that all pleasure (of reading 
or of sex) is ejaculatory" (p. 72). 
In his last two chapters, Boone breaks the boundaries of the marriage plot 
altogether, devoting a chapter each to separatist communities of men and 
communities of women. Focusing on the American quest narrative as a 
counter-traditional genre, he examines the hidden sexual politics in Moby 
Dick, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Billy Budd, and The Sea Wolf. But far 
from lamenting the lost Eden of a world without women, Boone examines 
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the brutalizing effects of male supremacy-on men. Thus in each of these 
texts, a man is subjugated to an erotics of domination; he takes the place of 
Woman as other, alien. In contrast, by escaping from a marriage-oriented cul-
ture, characters like Ishmael and Huck escape not from women, but from a 
dominant sexual order which is the focus of the novelists' critique. Since Ish-
mael and Huck achieve a "transgressive sense of identity that ... is multi-
form, fluid, and affirming in its integrity ... the male bond presents a con-
ceptual alternative to the gender inequality institutionalized by marriage in 
heterosexual relationships" (p. 272). Ironically, Melville and Twain turn out 
to be less conservative than Hemingway and Mailer, who each reinscribe the 
taboo against homosexuality and capitulate to the male fantasy of a world 
without women. 
Boone concludes by comparing male counterplots to female counterplots 
and communities of women in Millenium Hall, Cranford, The Country of the 
Pointed Firs, and Herland. The emancipatory joy in these female communi-
ties, the counter-traditional plotting and structural innovations which so de-
viated from conventional love-plots may, Boone speculates, account for the 
willful scholary neglect of these novels when they first appeared. He ends by 
relating these early visions of feminist utopias to texts by Djuna Barnes, Glo-
ria Naylor, and Pat Barker. These models make "the materiality of woman's 
existence ... the material of the text itself" p. 329), thereby suggesting a new 
novelistic paradigm of ecrilure feminine. Feminist criticism thus not only rec-
ognizes old paradigms, but actively participates in the creation of new ones. 
This marks the end of the "novelistic marriage tradition and the sexual ideol-
ogy embedded in it, when challenged by the transforming presence of the 
counter-traditional text, be it the undermining dialogue _ of uneasy wedlock, 
the male quest into a world of alternate possibilities, or the sustaining fiction 
of female community" (p. 330). 
In contrast to such books as Rene Girard's Deceit, Desire, and the Novel or 
Denis de Rougemont's Love in the Western World, Boone's study demonstrates 
the enormous difference that feminist criticism makes when analyzing narra-
tives of romantic love. Boone's lively and far-reaching book is a significant 
contribution to novel studies, one that deftly combines literary history with 
cultural critique, formal analyses with feminist politics. It is a persuasive 
study of the relation of social ideology to narrative structure, and a provoca-
tive presentation of both the ideologically coercive and potentially subversive 
strains in love and the form of fiction. 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Linda Kauffman 
Nostalgia and Sexual Difference: The Resistance to Contemporanj Feminism by 
Janice Doane and Devon Hodges. London and New York: Methuen, 1987. 
Pp. 160. $22.50 (cloth), $9.95 (paper). 
In the nineteenth century, "nostalgia" was a medical term denominating a 
specific form of mental disease-a yearning for one's home or country. For 
twentieth-century readers, the term has acquired a rather different cluster of 
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meanings; it implies now a particular set of attitudes towards history-the 
longing for a state which has passed, whether in one's own life, or in that of 
society as a whole. No longer is nostalgia considered a form of mental path-
ology, a disease which should be subjected to medical correction, but is 
viewed rather as a fairly harmless attitude of mind to which we are all more 
or less prone. In Nostalgia and Sexual Difference, Doane and Hodges examine 
the invidious operations of nostalgia within contemporary discourse, as writ-
ers from a whole spectrum of fields attempt to deflect the challenge of femi-
nism. Coming at a time when the new right is gaining an increasing ideologi-
cal stranglehold, both in Reagan's America and Thatcher's England, the 
study is particularly welcome. 
The authors have chosen an interesting series of figures to examine, rang-
ing from novelists such as George Stade and John Irving through to such in-
fluentialliterary and cultural critics as Christopher Lasch, Harold Bloom, Ivan 
Illich, and Peter Berger. Although the list is necessarily eclectic, and cannot 
hope to be inclusive, one very surprising omission is that of the work of fe-
male writers. The study looks neither at the work of avowedly anti-feminist 
female writers (with the exception of Brigitte Berger), nor considers in depth 
the more problematic category of feminist writers who themselves employ 
nostalgic modes of thought. Although Hodges and Doane frequently refer to 
the work of feminists who endorse fixed models of sexual difference (and 
thus qualify, according to the authors' definition, for the nostalgia camp), 
they do not focus on their work directly, or examine the reasons underlying 
their particular choice of theoretical position. The project as a whole suffers 
in consequence: "nostalgia" emerges as a loosely-defined term, associated 
preeminently with a desire to maintain patriarchal authority, and the cultural 
and political complexities of the feminist struggle are glossed over. 
In their discussion of the representation of the figure of the feminist, or 
"monstrous amazon/' in contemporary male fiction, the authors point as-
tutely to the ways in which social ideologies of "fun" are used to disarm seri-
ous feminist critiques. The authors' own tendency to adopt a sanctiomonious 
tone, however, does little to help their argument. Of Ishmael Reeds' work, 
Reckless Eyeballing, they observe, for example, that '" naturally,' we have an 
author who is also supposed to be outside all the cultural codes he is so ob-
viously reproducing, despite the fact that these books, as even their authors 
must realize, are consumer products" (p. 43). Here as elsewhere, the author 
emerges in comparison with the sharp-eyed critic as a very blinkered crea-
ture, endowed with a critical naivete about his own work which is almost 
touching. Are novelists really the last people in the world to realize that their 
works are consumer products? The supposition, in this case, that Reed be-
lieved himself to be outside the cultural codes codes he was reproducing 
seems to be entirely that of Hodges and Doane. 
Throughout this study the authors tend to overplay their hand. Although 
the foundations of their arguments are usually good, they weaken their case 
by attributing to the subjects of their study a particularly simplistic belief in 
the realist illusion which they then proceed to debunk. A potentially interest-
ing discussion of John Irving's The World According to Carp, for example, is 
marred by their insistence that "for Irving, narrative structure is a natural 
way to achieve and reflect the truth" (p. 73). This assertion rests in tUrn on 
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the rather curious claim that the novel follows a traditional narrative se-
quence. Although Garp cannot rival the experimentalism of the modern 
French novel, it clearly departs, with its several embedded narratives, from a 
conventional linear format, and far from unreflectively endorsing notions of 
narrative "truth/' it takes the issue of narrativity as one of its subjects. Irving, 
like Reed, is turned in this study into a strawman, representative of an inde-
fensible position. Theoretical debate ceases to be productive, however, if it is 
conducted on the grounds of attributing to one's opponent the weakest posi-
tion possible. 
The framework of Doane and Hodges' critique of nostalgia will be familiar 
to readers of contemporary critical theory: realism's belief in a stable referent 
(a position here aligned with nostalgia) is set against a commitment to the 
philosophy of linguistic "play," a belief that identity and difference are con-
structed in language. It remains unclear, however, whether this framework is 
adequate to the political exigencies of the contemporary struggle against a 
right-wing backlash. With its insistent, reiterated demonstrations of the illu-
sions of referentiality, the Derridean and Lacanian position could itself be 
convicted of a form of nostalgia (albeit expressed in a displaced, negative 
form): a yearning for lost plenitude, for the moment of full presence, whose 
absence can only be adequately compensated for by renewed assertions of its 
impossibility. If such demonstrations are to be rendered political useful they 
must be treated as the beginning, rather than the self-sufficient end of in-
quiry. In their treatment of Ivan I11ich, the authors contrast his commitment 
to sexual stereotypes and "going backwards" to their own, more open belief 
in the linguistic construction of difference: "If differences are in the making, 
real surprise is possible. We look to the future" (p. 113). Such a simple asser-
tion bypasses all the problems raised in the recent complex theoretical de-
bates concerning the relationship betw-een language and the material world, 
and the peculiar difficulties faced by women in attempting to employ patriar-
challanguage as an instrument of social change. Although the authors would 
probably disagree with much of this scholarship they need to take it into ac-
count, to demonstrate why the perceived problems are in fact illusory. 
Of the figures considered in the book, Ivan Illich, together with Peter and 
Brigitte Berger, offers potentially the most interesting profile. When this erst-
while radical spokesman can speak of women's "flesh" being frustrated 
when they are thrust out of their normal "homemaking" role, one knows 
that something has gone badly wrong. Illich and Peter Berger, two of the 
most prominent cultural gurus of the radical left in the 60s and 70s, are now 
making pronouncements on gender politics which would seem to proceed di-
rectly from the camp of the moral majority. Why is this happening? Could 
these positions have been implicit in their earlier work? and have they both 
shifted their political stance in other areas, or is this phenomenon peculiarly 
associated with the domain of gender? Although Doane and Hodges offer an 
analysis of the discourse of their two selected texts, this relative narrowness 
of focus hinders them from raising these larger questions. Nor do they ad-
dress the issue of why, at this specific political moment, the backlash against 
feminism has occurred. The Berger text in particular deserves a more complex 
analysis than it receives: there is frequently a disjunction behveen the quoted 
text and the views Doane and Hodges then attribute to the Bergers. Interest-
118 Criticism, Vol. XXX, No.1: Book Reviews 
ingly, Peter Berger does not seem to have shifted too far from the epistemo-
logical position he outlined (with Thomas Luckmann) in his influential work, 
The Social Construction of Reality (1966). Does this therefore mean that this 
position is not inherently radical but is in fact compatible with a thorough-
going conservatism? The question is an important one for Doane and Hodges 
since their own theoretical stance and political platform is grounded on very 
similar foundations to that of Berger's earlier work. If a commitment to lin-
guistic constructivism can be used to sustain a socially reactionary stance, 
then clearly any effective political response to the new right cannot solely be 
confined to an attempt to overturn "realism" and its associated epistemologi-
cal tenets. 
This recent shift to the right in gender politics is not confined to male cul-
tural spokesmen: early leaders of the women's movement are also involved. 
Doane and Hodges allude to the fact that figures such as Betty Friedan, Ger-
maine Greer and Jean Elshtain have all "expressed concern about feminism's 
effect on founding structures" (p. 134) but they do not pursue this crucial is-
sue. Why are all these influential figures seemingly turning their back on all 
our apparent gains? Are their responses particular to the internal dynamics of 
the women's movement, or are they directly related to the wider political 
spectrum? Nostalgia seems at the moment to provide the ideological fuel for 
the entire right-wing political platform. Thatcher's reign in England is 
grounded on her claims to be returning to the world of "Victorian Values." It 
is a moot point, however, whether the sentiments of nostalgia are in them-
selves necessarily inherently reactionary. In the Victorian age itself, for exam-
ple, the celebration of medieval culture had diverse political connotations: in 
the hands of Carlyle it was turned into a defence of a fixed, hierarchical soci-
ety, but in William Morris' writings it formed the basis of a radical critique of 
industrial capitalism. Even in the works of Marx one can discern the work-
ings of nostalgia. His famous yearning for a time when all men could be 
hunter, fisher, shepherd, and critic within the compass of a day clearly draws 
its strength from the nostalgic rhetoric of a golden age. Although such vi-
sions are undoubtedly illusory, they nonetheless serve a necessary political 
function in offering a rallying impetus for action. Could nostalgia perform a 
similar function for the women's movement? or are all its manifestations nec-
essarily linked to a reactionary political stance? 
In their postscript, Hodges and Doane directly confront the problem that 
many feminist writers actively endorse a politics of sexual difference 
(whether they perceive this "difference" to be biologically or only culturally 
grounded). The authors admit that it could be argued that" effective political 
action depends on women's ability to define themselves as different, as a dis-
tinct group" but conclude that such a perception "underestimates the connec-
tion between the decentralization of the feminist movement and its strength: 
because there are many feminisms, the movement does not depend on the 
fortunes of a single leader or group. We are accustomed to think in terms of 
the powers associated with accumulation and identity rather than of the 
powers associated with dispersion and rupture precisely because the conven-
tions of discourse, based on binary oppositions that preserve identity, insist 
that we do" (p. 141). Is the belief that power derives from unity and coher-
ence solely a convention of discourse? The problem of identity is a peculiarly 
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tangled one for feminist activists. If one opposes biological essentialism, and 
the male grouping of "woman," is one left without a constituency from 
which to fight? To point to the advantages of decentralisation is not to re-
solve the problem: even within a dispersed group, one still needs a platform 
from which to speak, an ideological rallying point. To insist on the powers of 
dispersion and rupture is to view the social through the limiting grid of lin-
guistic theory. Have the strategies of dispersion and rupture ever been effec-
tive in a concrete, political struggle? If the thrust of the contemporary back-
lash against feminism is to be itself dispersed and contained, it must be met 
by a united front, which extends its activities beyond the domain of lan-
guage. 
University of Leeds Sally Shuttleworth 
Patte,."s of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures by Michael Bax-
andall. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985. Pp. x + 147. 
Ills. 62. $18.95. 
For a number of years Michael Baxandall has played an important if dis-
creet part in orienting art historical inquiry away from questions of connois-
seurship and inconography towards a more rigorous historicism, Preoccupied 
with the ways in which extra-artistic pressures,-whether economic, political, 
religious, cultural, social, linguistic, scientific, or geographical-have come to 
shape works of art, Baxandall has suggested new terms by which art, in par-
ticular Renaissance painting and sculpture, may be understood as an expres-
sion of its time and place. His Giotto and tile Omlors (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1971) revealed how visual taste of the early Renaissance, as.exempli-
fied in the notion of composition, was shaped by the conventions of human-
ist rhetoric, while Painting and Experience in Fifteentlt-Century Italy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1972) discussed quattrocento style as a response to 
popular social and economic practices of the time such as dancing and mer-
chantile systems of proportion. A more recent study, The Umewood Sculptors 
of Renaissance Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) proposed 
to "look through the sculptures into Renaissance Germany, the carvings 
being sometimes addressed as lenses bearing on their own circumstances" 
(p. vii). 
Baxandall's concerns with the conditions under ,,,,hich a work of art is pro-
duced and consumed have come to be shared by a number of art historians. 
As yet, however, this "new historicism" does not offer a method, for beyond 
the general consensus that the intersection between culture and history needs 
to be more carefully examined, there are significant disagreements about ho\\' 
historical interpretation should proceed. This was the subject of a session at 
the College Art Association's annual meeting in 1985 entitled" Art or Soci-
ety: l\lust \Ve Choose?" Chaired by Sevtlana Alpers, the panel included 
Thomas Crow, Stephen Greenblatt, Natalie Zemon Davis, and !\.·Iichael Bax-
andall: the proceedings were published in Rcprl'sclltafic))ls (No. 12, Fall 1985, 
pp. 1-4:3). As that session made clear, the nen' historicism needs to be exam-
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ined in terms of its relationship to what might be called the "old historicism" 
(history of ideas, social history, traditional Marxism) and to the current de-
bate over critical theory and language. Baxandall's cautious and at times dis-
senting voice in the discussion at eAA would lead one to expect that his 
present book, Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures, 
would offer an exposition not only of the problems of historical interpretation 
as he sees them, but also an analysis of these problems within a larger critical 
framework. Unfortunately, the book is a disappointment on both counts. 
Patterns of Intention begins by asking on what grounds we offer an histori-
cal interpretation of a picture, how we go about "inferring" intention in a 
work in order to place it histOrically. Baxandall's first task is to explore the 
language of art criticism. While his discussion of the effect of language en-
gages many of the issues raised by structuralist and deconstructionist literary 
critics, his interest stops short of pure linguistic hermeneutics, of treating the 
work of art as a text, for instance, or determining its role as a signifier. His 
impatience with this kind of theoretical approach is obvious: "the useful role 
for historians bent on reflection seems to me not to offer loose prescriptive 
generalizations under the description of 'theory' but rather to test quite sim-
ple positions against cases as complex as time and energy permit" (p. vii). 
While one might sympathize with Baxandall's intent not to turn his book into 
a meditation on deconstruction, it is nevertheless disturbing to find the im-
portant problems of language and representation raised either directly or im-
plicitly by his method dismissed on the grounds of utility. His anti-theoretical 
pragmatism is not so complete as to do away with the problema tics of critical 
language. He observes, for instance, that the inferences we make about a pic-
ture when we describe it are "less a representation of the picture, or even a 
representation of seeing a picture, than a representation of thinking about 
having seen a picture," hence our description will not refer to the picture but 
to the "effect the picture has on us," and wili depend "for such precision as it 
has on the presence of the picture" (p. 11). Unfortunately this process of cog-
nitive representation, the fact that such language is by necessity subjective 
and histOrically shaped and in this sense radically interpretive, is not subse-
quently addressed in full. 
One of the main purposes of his discussion of critical language would seem 
to be to discount the relevance of the linguistic and semiological concepts of 
reflected meaning or connotation in formulating an historical interpretation 
of pictures. Baxandall observes that "in art-critical description one is using 
the terms not absolutely; one is using them in tandem with the object ... 
What is determining for them is that, in art criticism or art history, the object 
is present or available-really, or in reproduction, or in memory, or (more 
remotely) as rough visualization derived from knowledge of other objects of 
the same class' (p. 8). What is problematic in this statement, however, is that 
reality, reproduction, memory and rough visualization are presented as 
equivalent forms of imagistic "presence," and that their power to impose a 
second order of meaning on the image is not considered. Thus Baxandall's 
description of the "facts of language that become prominent in art criticism 
... that have radical implications for how one can explain pictures" (p. 11) is 
compromised from the start by an indifference to the complexities of these 
facts. 
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In what would seem to be a similar utilitarian gesture toward simplifying 
the process of historical interpretation, he dismisses the "more structured 
models offered by various versions of Ideology" preferring instead a "simple 
model of exchange" to describe the relationship between the painter and his 
culture (p. viii). Baxandall describes this exchange with the French term 
"troe," which means a barter or swap. By his own admission the book is not 
about the "dynamics of culture" and thus if "told that the book is inadequate 
as a sociology of art I shall be unmoved" (p. viii). Baxandall's use of a uto-
pian model of exchange is a nostalgic fiction that enables him to avoid con-
sidering the concrete processes that have historically regulated human insti-
tutions and existence. One questions the wisdom of using such an a-historical 
model as the basis for an "historical interpretation of pictures" when so 
much of that interpretation depends on accurately illucidating the philosoph-
ical, ecomonic, and material relationships that obtain between art and soci-
ety. 
As his indifference to the sOciology of art suggests, Baxandall's method at-
tempts to consider the role of culture within art without ever considering the 
role of art within culture. As a result, the works of art he treats become mere 
reflections of various aspects of culture rather than agents of culture, and cul-
ture functions primarily as an influence rather than as a context. Along these 
lines, Baxandall has suggested that because, IIiArt' and 'society' ... are un-
homologous systematic constructions put upon interpenetrating subject mat-
ters," in order "to get neat matches" we must "work through derived mid-
dles between 'art' and 'society', namely a) 'culture' and b) that element in 
'art' that can be seen as institutional or as a function of institutions" (Repre-
sentations, 12, pp. 42-43). Baxandall's discovery and characterization of some 
of these middle grounds where the work of art and its historical circum-
stances interpenetrate in the process of exchange ("troc") has been a major 
contribution to the study of art in its social context. What has been less help-
ful is his tendency to reduce all that is meant by art and society in order for 
his mechanistic model of "troc" to work. 
In order for troe to work, differences must become equivalencies, thus Bax-
andall must ignore the presence in the work of art signs of class and other 
forms of social difference (gender, race, sexuality). Rather than speak of class, 
Baxandall prefers to speak of II experience" as if it were somehow uniform 
and one dimensional. Not surprisingly the book's most powerful chapter il-
lustrates a rare case when an artist's and society's definition of experience re-
pressed questions of social difference in an attempt to establish a universal 
standard of perception. In Chardin's painting of A Lady Drinking Tea, Baxan-
dall's method finds its perfect analogue in the painter's own empiricism. Fo-
cusing on the "relations between the visual interest of pictures and (taking 
the extreme case) the systematic thought, science or philosophy, of the cul-
ture they come from" (p. 74), he begins by observing that certain areas 
within the painting are less distinct than others, these inconsistencies of focus 
or visual acuity respond to the new optics of Newton and Lock as they came 
to be popularly understood in the eighteenth century. Here Baxandall's visual 
analysis and scholarship is dazzlingly acute. His discussion of the painting 
and the texts that impinge on it is a model of all that is visually and intellec-
tually compelling in his approach. Under Baxandall's scrutiny, the painting 
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becomes an ""enacted record of attention" which we re-enact when we look 
at the painting; thus, he concludes: "Lockean pictures represent, in the guise 
of sensation, perception or complex ideas of substance, not substance itselflr 
(pp. 102-103). One cannot help but wish that this essay had not ended with 
a meditation on the way this painting may be seen to encapsulate Chardin's 
longing for his fIrst wife. It is an observation which tends to collapse forgoing 
analysis of the relation between the painting and its culture into a description 
of the heroic and stoic nature of Chardin's vision. This sudden shift of focus 
in the essay from the social to the personal avoids the problem of what the 
painting's "effect of the real" might mean in the context of Chardin's public 
and the cultural institutions that supported his vision. By way of comparison, 
we have recently seen in Thomas Crow's Painters and Public Life in Eigh-
teenth-Century Paris (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985; especially 
chapters 4 and 5) and John Barrell's The Political Theory of Painting from Rey-
nolds to Hazlitt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) how important 
such questions can be when we attempt an historical interpretation of a 
painting. 
The troublesome limitations of Baxandall's positivist approach to historical 
analysis are most evident in the chapters on Benjamin Barker's Bridge over 
the Forth and Picasso's Portrait of Daniel Kahnweiler. It is perhaps unfair to be 
too critical of these first two chapters because they are clearly intended to be 
rudimentary introductions to Baxandall's basic analytic procedure rather than 
full orchestrations of it. Yet given the subtlety of the mind at work, they are 
disappointing. Baxandall discusses the historical intention of the work (its 
"brief") as something mirrored in the appearance of the object. It is signifi-
cant that he chooses to start with Barker's bridge since here we have a fairly 
straight forward example of form following function. Baxandall proposes that 
paintings, like bridges, are "pieces of problem solving" but is quick to note 
that unlike bridges their manifest objective (or "charge") is not to "span" but 
to create uvisual interest on the surface of a canvas." In spite of the care he 
takes to distinguish bridges from pictures, the model of Barker's bridge does 
color his analysiS of paintings, obscuring some of the problematic differences 
between real objects and representations. According to the bridge model· we 
find, by and large, that formalist paintings are about formalism (Picasso), 
empirical paintings are about empiricism (Chardin), and religious paintings 
are about religion (Piero). 
His reading of the Portrait of Kahnweiler does not differ much from tradi-
tional formalist readings of Picasso's work. According to Baxandall, Picasso 
internalized the general "charge" to create visual interest making it the cen-
tral intention (or "brief") of his art. Given the limits of this brief, social reali-
ties, such as the art market, the public exhibition and the critics, are seen to 
play a decidedly secondary role in determining Picasso's formal choices. 
While it would be wrong to argue that Cubism is not a formalist movement 
within modem painting or that the Kahnweiler portrait does not demonstrate 
a formal engagement of Cezanne's work, to limit this formalism to a "medi-
tation on his [Picasso's] own perceptual process' (p. 71) and to offer this as an 
historical interpretation for the painting is perverse. By contrast, Yve-AIain 
Bois challanging and perceptive historical explanation of this formalism re-
veals the importance of Saussure's structural linguistics for Cubism ("Kahn-
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weiler's Lesson," Representations, No. 18, Spring 1987, pp. 33-68). Bois anal-
ysis does not do away with Cubism's formalism it simply sets out its mean-
ing in the context of larger historical and epistemological developments. If we 
see Picasso's Portrait of Kahnweiler only in terms of Picasso's meditation on 
his own perceptual process, we may have reconstructed an aspect of the 
work' 5 intention but we remain in a state of mystification if we mistake this 
for the work's historical meaning or significance. Too often what Baxandall 
would seem to be performing is what Croce would call archaeology (the sort-
ing and ordering of primary data) not history (the interpretation of that data). 
Baxandall's reluctance to involve his analysis in any form of second order 
interpretation, (discussions of representation, connotation, ideology, myth, 
"meaning"), and his tendency to dismiss their relevance by trying to estab-
lish a model for historical intention that excludes them does not set him very 
far apart from the formalist and iconographic interpretive traditions in art 
history. It is interesting then to find that, in the last chapter, Baxandall's at-
tempts to distinguish his process of inferential criticism from iconography by 
contrasting several iconographical interpretations of Piero della Francesca's 
Baptism of Christ with his own analysis of its historical intention. The chapter 
is intended to show how we can explain "the intention of an artist living in a 
culture or period remote from our own" (p. 105), and the fault he finds with 
the various iconographical readings of the painting is that by falling back 
"into the habit of looking for 'meaning' one sought 'signs' and of course im-
mediately found them. The second source of error was to attend too little to 
Piero's peculiar pictorial idiom . .. " (p. 125). Piero's "brief," as reconstructed 
by Baxandall, consisted of "producing in his idiom an altarpiece image (with 
all that implies) in which the main heads of the matter of Matthew 3 are 
effectively treated in an active relation to a pictorial tradition itself constitut-
ing part of the problem" (p. 131). This conclusion does not in the end seem 
any less reductive than the various iconographical interpretations of the 
painting which Baxandall rightly questions. The reason for this has to do 
with the limitations Baxandall has placed all along on the notion of "inten-
tion" which he sees as "an analytical construct about his [the artist's] ends 
and means, as we infer them from the relation of the object to identifiable 
circumstances" (p. 109). What such a definition refuses to consider is the pos-
sibility that a painting as a representation of historical intention may ulti-
mately exceed that intention in ways that its original purpose and meaning 
could neither anticipate nor control. Baxandall's basic confidence in the deno-
tative power of the image skews his analysis of historical intention in such a 
way as to reduce nearly all questions of meaning to mechanistic descriptions 
of formalist causality. 
My emphasis on the theoretical implications of Baxandall's treatment of 
the works he discusses has not allowed me to do justice to the many provoc-
ative and profound insights contained in these interpretations. One admires 
the depth and range of knowledge that he continually brings to a topic, and 
even more so when it results, as in the Chardin chapter, in a new and impor-
tant revelation about the cultural context of a work. One is also continually 
struck by the sensitivity of his eye and the veracity of his visual analysis even 
when his method prevents him from fully developing the historical implica-
tions of an artist's formal choices. Thus his refusal to openly engage the cur-
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rent debates over representation, ideology, and language seems all the more 
unfortunate given the strength of his intellectual powers and the subtlety of 
her visual perceptions. Nevertheless, because this refusal would seem to con-
fIrm the relevance of this debate to the formation of his own intellectual posi-
tion, his aloofness from the fray finally appears to disguise a rather aggresive 
guerrilla attack. One might ask: "What is Baxandall's brief?" The problems 
with which he deals are fundamentally linguistic, so his evasion of them by 
alternately insisting on his lack of expertise in this area or their inconvenient 
complexity has the unhappy effect of elevating this "ignorance" and "expe-
diency" to the level of a method. 
While Baxandall may not care to deal with the problems of modem lin-
guistic theory, modem linguistic theory is only too ready and able to deal 
with his. For instance, in aspiring to a straightforward approach to historical 
intention, one which scrupulously avoids the tenninology of contemporary 
critical discourse as surely as it avoids its concepts, Baxandall must invent a 
jargon of his own. Merely to use the old language of art history would not 
register his awareness of contemporary theory or his reaction against it. Thus 
the terms "brief," "charge," and "troc," come into play, terms that clearly 
describe the denotative relationship Baxandall wishes to reassert between the 
work of art and its historical intention. In aspiring to the level of linguistic 
transparency and universal legibility, his terminology evokes a mythic homo-
geneous audience who share this language. Just as the realities of class and 
social difference are suppressed in his historical interpretation of pictures so 
too are they silenced in his discourse. While it is certainly not his intention, it 
is unfortunate that Baxandall's book will appeal most to those who wish to 
preserve the status quo in art history by holding the fIeld against any further 
incursions from other disciplines (especially literature), and who will now 
have a new way to naturalize their position as historicism, art history, and 
perhaps even history itself. 
University of California, lroine Ann Bermingham 
Theatrical Legitimation: Allegories of Genius in Seventeenth-Century England 
and France by Timothy Murray. New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987. Pp. xli + 292, 9 figures. $22.50. 
Theatrical Legitimation is an insistently, self-professediy challenging book; 
its quarry is the "new historicism" and the discipline of comparative litera-
ture, and the charge against both is their submission to "master-narratives" 
of continuity that permit the recovery of a past-without-difference. To these 
diSciplines, the book's title offers its answer, a legitimization of theatricality 
as criticism-or, better, as theory, since the etymolOgical connection of the-
ater and theory is taken to guarantee the enterprise. "Allegory" is (thanks to 
Walter Benjamin and Paul deMan) another word for theory in this study, 
which reads instances of seventeenth-century theatricality through the dis-
courses of anti-theatricality mounted by the "puritan" and Baconian oppo-
nents of the English stage and their Jansenist counterparts in France. Murray 
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aims to demonstrate how the antitheatrical charges were met by strategies to 
contain theater and to show the limits of these endeavors. Since containment 
is what he studies, his evidence is taken from the margins that police the 
drama-the textual apparatus of Ben Jonson's Workes, the epistles that frame 
French theater texts, the theory of d' Aubignac. The first aims to secure the 
genius of the author, the second the genius of Richelieu, the partron, the 
third, the genius of the spectator. In the readings of these frames, Murray 
argues for a deconstructive play an abime, a phantasmal allegoresis with un-
bounded energies that refuse stabilization. If these are the frames of reason, 
continuity, coherence, they are disrupted by what they mean to secure-the-
ater and rhetoric. They offer "the phantasm of legitimate interpretation" 
(p. 17) that haunts the 'new' historicism and comparative literature, heirs of 
the antitheatricality and rationalism of the seventeenth-century. Murray re-
veals the "epistemological impurities" (p. 7) that undermine the frames; they 
legitimate his practice by overturning the norms of legitimation. 
Such, crudely stated, is the argument that prefaces the book, summarizing 
it. And, occasionally, as the book proceeds, these claims about the status of 
the book (its relation to the prevailing disciplinary practices) are reiterated, 
but not developed. Rather, by the last chapter, Murray tilts with Ernst Cas-
sirer as the evil genius of comparatism, and suggests a Kantian genealogy for 
him that arrives at Habermas and notions of rational consensus. In those fi-
nal pages, and occasionally earlier (usually at the beginnings or ends of chap-
ters or sections) the banner of theory is waved, normally by a flurry of cita-
tions, or an honorific rolecall: "contemporary readers from Jean-Luc Nancy 
and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe to Louis Marin and Michel Foucault delineate 
carefully and laboriously the paradigms upon which French neoclassicism is 
often understood to depend" (p. 193). What they have done so "carefully 
and laboriously," Murray does not stop to do. Theory is invoked throughout 
the book, so that to criticize it would be to criticize theory. The book, rather, 
"carefully and laboriously" delimits its activities to thge margins. The gesture 
is no doubt theoretical, sanctioned by Margins of Philosophy or "Parergon" or 
"Cartouches," or, perhaps better, the book simulates the gestures of theory. 
Yet its aim, to reveal the ruin of truth, goes no further than an overturning. 
Its truth is the charges of the antitheatricalists-the theater cannot be secured 
against its demonismi its truth, then, within its self-proclaimed terms, is an-
titheoretical. And saying this is not just to play with words; for theater, ban-
ished from Murray's text as it would be for any antitheatricalist, is, by its ab-
sence, secured as a locus of energy, freedom, sexuality, imagination. In the 
thinly disguised misogyny of this text, theater might be (is) called woman. 
"Carefully and laboriously," Murray devotes his first hundred pages to a 
reading of the textual apparatus of the first Jonson folio, to the design of the 
title page, the layout of the catalogue of contents, the disposal of text and ed-
itorial apparatus in the masques. The point of the argument is that Jonson's 
antitheatricality manifests itself in his move from stage to page, and that 
print, with its enforcing frames, attempts to reposition theater as text, with all 
the stability that Elizabeth Eisenstein has claimed for the technology. Murray 
cannot be faulted for demurring from this mythos of authorial genius or its 
supposed enshrinement in the book, the "figuration and fetishization of au-
thorial genius" (p. 65) manifest through a technology that is not merely a 
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mode of mechanical reproduction. Under suspicion, he reads Jonson's "tex-
tual sovereignty" (P. 73) and its allegory of the authorial mind fully in con-
trol of text and reader. The critical consensus that Murray plucks from this 
configuration he calls "Jonson & Johnson," a corporation devoted to reason 
and scandalized by theatrical excess. Murray's figure embraces Cleopatra. 
I have no desire to argue against this representation of Jonson; it is compel-
ling. It is also familiar, as Murray acknowledges, citing Jonas Barish, Richard 
Newton, Richard Helgerson (although work along these lines by Thomas 
Greene and David Quint is ignored). What Murray adds to this work is an 
animus directed against it and an elaboration of the protocols of legitimate 
reading. Thus, glancing at the catalogue, Murray secures his argument that 
the patron is subordinated to the work of art by the typography of the sec-
ond line of the catalogue, where the columns of names of works and names 
of designated patrons virtually meet; "Every Man out of his Humor, To the 
INNES of COVRT," the line reads, and Murray reads it: "Unlike the other 
sets of title and dedication, this pair's textual spacing is contiguous, thus 
stresing the title's minimizing the difference between play and dedication. 
Spatial contiguity here catalyzes the nominal association of Jonson's plays 
with the ideal reading public of courtly society" (p. 75). Similarly, pausing 
over the titlepage, Murray ponders the presence of the PASTOR that seems 
so out of place on the theatrical scene; and, not surprisingly, he emerges as a 
figure of Jonson the critic. These are strained arguments. The textual appa-
ratus is read as if every point must deliver the thesis. This is "allegorical" 
reading indeed, but it is not deManian; rather it is a dogged point-for-point 
allegorism. And the theory that it manifests is just the sort that those who 
proclaim themselves against theory decry: global and universalizing abstrac-
tion. Such theory is complicit with the project of the dehistoricized corpora-
tion that Murray calls Jonson & Johnson. 
Jonson's textual sovereignty banishes the sovereign from Murray's pages; 
with the French theater, Richelieu comes to take that place. Within the pro-
fessedly anti-('new') historicist aims of this theoretical reading, Murray trans-
ports Stephen Orgel's readings of Jacobean court theater to the French scene 
without considering the legitimacy of that move. As a theorist his concern is 
anything but the master-narrative of continuity or the comparatist's reitera-
tion of the same. Thus, claims that have been made elsewhere are trans-
ported elsewhere as if they were only true in France. As Murray reads the 
epistles prefacing French drama of the mid-seventeenth century, he finds 
them portraying an allegory of legitimacy for the theater through the portrait 
of the patron. Richelieu is constructed through this discourse, so that his per-
formance as spectator of theater legitimates it: "Richelieu's face reflected the 
vision of his perspective. And the actual depth of the cardinal's perception 
was not as significant as the allegorical image of perspective-reason, judg-
ment, and power-which the viewer was asked to perceive, indeed, was 
asked to acknowledge, as Richelieu" (p. 122). Again, I would not quarrel 
with this description but with the dehistoricized procedures it means to legiti-
mate. (The margins of my copy of Theatrical Legitimation are littered with 
queries-how is this 'eyeing' related to English absolutism, for example; how 
is the constructed face related to that trope in Shakespeare; questions de-
clared illegitimate by a comparativism that will not compare, and by the priv-
ilege of rupture; authors there, patrons here, and never the twain shall meet). 
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These procedures are even clearer in the final section of the book, a 'lec-
ture exacte' of D'Aubignac's La Pratiqlle dll tflea/rc. Here Murray sho\\'s his 
colors (that's his trope for troping), revealing that the licencing of the plea-
sures of the spectator in D' Aubignac 'deconstructs' (that's his \vord for critical 
demurral) the ideology of legitimacy, for the pleasures are-ultimately-a 
woman's passion, over which 'reason, judgment, and power' cannot prevail. 
The true theater is an invisible one, and what the spectator sees, moved by 
the rhetoric of theater, is the primal scene. Mommy-or Julia Kristeva. "Ener-
getic spectating always already critiques or, more specifically, deconstructs 
the mechanisms of reason and taste sublime" (p. 216). In Tflcatrical Legitima-
tiOIl, energetic spectation occurs on the margins, \vatching a scene that is at 
once never produced and over-produced. 
The JOh11S Hopki11s U11iversity Jonathan Goldberg 
Recol1stnlctillg Individ1ialism. AutOllOIIIY, Illdividuality, alld the Self ill iVes/cm 
Thought, edited by Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986. Pp. xiv + 365. $39.50 (cloth), 
$11. 95 (paper). 
This is a timely collection of essays whose unusually high quality and 
whose disciplinary and methodological breadth will serve well the vcry 
broad academic audience for which the collection was clearly conceived. At 
the same time, the methodological variety may \vell raise a p;actical question 
about the utility of this as a collection and a critical question about the collec-
tive theoretical consequence of these essays. A glance at the table of contents 
indicates that the essays do not follow a theoretical or thematic progression. 
(There is thus no preferred order in which to read the essays and the reader 
is better off inventing her own.) The introduction by Heller and Vvellbery 
notes that the "arrangement of the essays[ ... ]is necessarily contingent, re-
flecting one of several possible readings (pp. 2-3). This fact is apparent 
enough, yet it is also one \vhich dra\vs attention to the lack of cumulative 
force in the volume. The introduction's recourse to Richard Rorty's vague 
and facile language about "an open and evolving conversation in which 
voices from many disciplines work out shared views and differences in a 
common labor of edification" does not compensate for the absence of a firm 
sense of what is at stake in "reconstructing individualism" (p. i). 
Possible doubt about the volume's theoretical consequence follows from 
doubt about its usefulness as a collection. As its title suggests, the \'olume 
proposes that it is time to reopen discussion of the concepts of au~onomy, in-
dividuality and selfhood. Although the contributions do engage these issues, 
and some surpassingly, they all do so in application to a quite discrete topic 
and "'ilhout agreement as to what is at issue in concepts like indi\'idualism 
and autonon1\'. The reader \\'ill miss an\' discussion of the relation of ~ubjec­
li\'ity and ind'ividualisITI in the modern age. This is a met<lcritical point which 
11l<ly weli go be~'ond the objecti\'es of the contributors <15 \\'ell 015 the editors. 
yet it is one that needs to be TT'Iade given the scope and \\'l'ightines':- ()f tIll' 
mattl'rs considered. 
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Cavils and questions do not detract from the individual distinctions of this 
volume. By contrast with many recent volumes dedicated to the representa-
tion of a school or theory of criticism, this one allows differences plainly to 
emerge. It is impossible to give all sixteen essays equal attention, but by 
making clusters of a number of them I hope to elicit their peculiar contribu-
tions and differences. 
Four essays in this volume, John Freccero's "Autobiography and Narra-
tive," James Clifford's "On Ethnographic Self-Fashioning: Conrad and Mali-
nowski," Christine Brooke-Rose's "The Dissolution of Character in the Nov-
e}" and Martha Nussbaum's "Love and the Individual" all center on the crea-
tion of self or character in narrative. The first, Freccero's, is also the lead 
essay in the volume. Understandably so, in that his is an inviting, yet also 
keen analysis of the difference between narrated and narrating self in auto-
biography, principally in Augustine's Confessions. Freccero points out the dif-
ference of Augustine's linear narration of converssion as one definitive tem-
poral sequence from the mixed narration of Theresa of Avila, for whom there 
is no final turning point from which the self is only the redeemed writing self 
and no longer the self of conflict and historicity. Where Augustine projects 
the moment of conversion into a whole temporal sequence and hence into an 
ideal narrative of an ideal self, as faithful an imitator as Teresa is unable to 
reiterate strictly his allegorization of self-history as salvation history. Hints 
like this are not completely developed, yet they also need not have been. 
Freccero gives us matter enough for reflection. The remaining three essays do 
not attain Freccero's level of insight and clarity. Of the three, Brooke-Rose's, 
though more a survey and proposal than an argument, is the most intriguing. 
On the one hand, she seems to wish to honor the achievements of "post-
modernist" fiction, that parodistic genre whose subject matter is previous fic-
tion and its characters verbal structures. On the other, she apparently thinks 
there is no future for fiction in meta-fiction. Instead, a regeneration of fiction 
will entail an aspiration of prose to the dense verbal texture of poetry and a 
renewed interest in character. The reader may only wonder whether such fic-
tion is not already among us. I think of the late Pier Paolo Pasolini's prose as 
one which has the evocative power of poetry and the live presence of charac-
ter without being mistakeable for traditional fiction. 
Clifford's essay sets for itself the promising task of tracing to c. 1900 the 
emergence of a "distinctive ethnographic subjectivity" marked by "partici-
pant observation" (pp. 141, 142). The task is well formulated and includes 
insights on "additive, metonymic empiricism," on "abrupt movement in im-
agery" and on "incongruence" as aspects of Conrad and Malinowski, yet its 
execution is in the main a somewhat plodding back and forth comparison of 
the two. 
Nussbaum's essay stands out as the most idiosyncratic. Occasioned by the 
discovery of a manuscript which had plagiarized her own work, Nussbaum 
proceeds to use that ms., labled a "hybrid of fiction and philosophy," to 
embed her own reflections on the individuality of the love object and the 
identity 01 oneselilrom one love object to the next (pp. 253, 257). The reader 
wonders whether Nussbaum herself escapes the label she has applied. The 
multiple framing of narrative within narrative and philosophical reflection 
within and on narrative requires an unusual finesse and skill in mediation of 
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discourses. Proust, who receives significant mention in this essay, was the 
master of that. Nussbaum does not reproduce his lesson. 
One is on more even terrain with the essays which treat from several per-
spectives self-identity: Carol Gilligan's "Remapping the Moral Domain," 
Nancy Chodorow's "Towards a Relational Individualism" and Natalie Dav-
is's "Boundaries and the Sense of Self in Sixteenth-Century France," Gilli-
gan's essay continues her widely recognized investigation into predisposi-
tions to autonomy and justice on the one side and to care and interaction on 
the other, predispositions to which distinct versions of moral agency belong 
(p. 241). In tracing these oppositional tendencies her concern is to break 
down oppositions altogether. For Gilligan, the central metaphor of identity 
formation should not be mirroring, with its connotations of isolation and ex-
clusive attachment, but dialogue (pp. 250-51). Although this approach leads 
Gilligan to reject the vocabulary of object relations as exceedingly separatist 
and "mirroring," as grounded in self-reflexivity rather than interaction, it is 
Chodorow who makes a strong case for the object-relations model as a 
means of "reconstruct[ingJ a self [ ... J fundamentally implicated in relations 
with others" (p. 199). Using Freud's "On Narcissism," Chodorow sees at 
stake in the object-relations model not an insistence on the preserve of the 
individual but "internal as well as external relatedness to the other" (p. 203). 
Chodorow's constructive sense of self-reflexivity deepens Gilligan's argument 
without undermining it. 
Natalie Davis's essay, the one strictly historical contribution, is a lucid rep-
resentation of how the social embeddedness of the individual, particularly 
woman, in sixteenth-century France not only did not preclude self-discovery 
but prompted it (p. 63). While it is true according to social convention that 
women were" given away" in marriage, Davis makes the case that in practice 
women could reverse this "cultural formation" and give themselves away 
(p. 61). The idea is of historical consequence, since its truth entails conceiving 
of a correspondingly greater self-consciousness among women and greater 
sense of ownership of their own bodies. In the fine overlap it cuts between 
the socia-cultural and the psychological Davis's essay refers both to Gilli-
gan's and Chodorow's work and to Stephen Greenblatt's "Fiction and Fric-
tion," the recounting of the "prodigious" history of Marin Ie Marcis, a person 
of ambiguous sexual identity whose want of proper sexual individuation 
aroused among clerical and medical authorities of the early seventeenth-cen-
tury awe, disbelief and, most instructively for Greenblatt's ends, a blind in-
sistence that Marin be one sex or the other. If Marin himself was regarded as 
marginal or worse, the discourse about him is representative of the way in 
which the prodigious was not only used to articulate the normative but also 
to "reintegrate" the prodigious into "normal structures of gender" (p. 45). 
Like Davis, Greenblatt is clear about the historical and cultural specificity, 
hence contingency and instability, of such structures. A difference between 
them is the rhetorical finesse with which Greenblatt puts to methodical use a 
metaphorical term like "friction," a term he shows was constitutively opera-
tive for Renaissance "knowledge" of sexual identity (pp. 38ff.). 
The matters of identity and gender are cast in a different frame by Michael 
Fried's "Courbe!'s Metaphysics: A Reading of the 'The Quarry.'" In a series 
of highly discriminated analyses which trace a pattern of "displaced or meta-
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phorical self-representations," Fried argues that the "the primacy of self-
representation" in Courbet does not privilege the artist but constitutes a dis-
persal of the self among objects and perspectives where no hierarchical order 
rules (pp. 91,95). Fried calls this effect one of "equivalence of translatability" 
and sees it informing an ideal of the "absolute continuity of nature" (p. 99). 
So if 'The Quarry,' as a scene of silenced violence, thematizes the reassertion 
of such continuity even in the act of breaking it, the later canvas 'Death of 
the Stag,' in narrating violence and pathos, reveals the fissures at the heart of 
Courbefs enterprise. 
Once one enters the philosophical region of this collection, any threads 
one may have been able to pull together are likely, predictably, to unravel. 
The essays of J.B. Schneewind and Ian Hacking on "The Use of Autonomy in 
Ethical Theory" and "Making Up People" have this much in common, that 
they warn us against the dangers of totalizing criticism (Schneewind) and to-
talizing explanation (Hacking). Schneewind does recognize the limitations 
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy: it does not presuppose, 
much less demonstrate, the existence of a substantial self or transcendental 
ego. Yet the concept of autonomous criticism and action is necessary if one is 
to think of society as self-legislating. (The editors' version of this argument in 
their introduction is quite different, pp. 5-6.) Hacking's essay is appealingly 
provisional in conception and tone as it pursues the argument that what I call 
myself and what I do, or what others call me and what I do, depends on "the 
possibilities of description." This dependence is neither chronological nor on-
tological but has the structure of simultaneity: possibility and descriptive 
structure "emerge[dJ hand in hand" (p. 225). Hacking wisely stops at this. He 
declines to predict that any general theory of making up people is to be had 
and thus avoids any massive generalizations on the nature of social control 
and power. 
The essays of two other philosophers, Werner Hamacher and Stanley Cav-
ell, are both the longest contributions and both equally unsuited to summary, 
albeit for altogether different reasons. Given the current interest in the conti-
nental sources of contemporary literary and critical theory, Hamacher's read-
ing of Nietzschean individualism as a thing beyond all category and concept, 
as "unaccountable surplus," serves as an exemplary lesson in thoroughness 
and rigor of argument (p. 110). In fact so thorough is Hamacher's exposition 
that one occasionally has the sense, also acquired from reading Foucault, that 
the expositor has been impersonally absorbed into the exposition. Hamacher 
writes wholly without the mannerisms-punning, tentativeness of assertion, 
self-regarding playfulness-which have marked much recent writing on 
Nietzsche. Still, for all its sobering rigor and consequence, Hamacher's essay 
does not entirely shun the declamatory pathos of Nietzsche's own assertions: 
11 ••• monological art . . . is theocidaI. It knows no other and recognizes no 
God who could betoken its determinate destiny" (p. 128). (For another view 
of Nietzsche one must tum to Paolo Valesio's brilliant but aphoristically dis-
continuous essay "The Beautiful Lie.") 
Finally, Cavell's "Being Odd, Getting Even: Threats to Individuality" con-
tains remarks on the reader's obedience to and enactment of texts which 
strike me as truly important for any theory of interpretive understanding. 
The essay as a whole, however, will prove somewhat recalcitrant to anyone 
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not already initiated into the peculiar discursivity of, say, The Claim of Rca-
SOIl. Though Cavell's essay may be an extreme case, it points up a drawback 
of this volume: despite the very high quality of the essays, taken as (l group 
they presuppose both too much and too little: too much of the contexts out of 
\vhich they individually come and too little of a common ground or set of 
questions. This book will be highly valued, if chiefly according to the indi-
vidual needs readers bring to it. 
Ulliversity of Tliisa John Jay Baker 
Poetic Forlll and British RomaJlticism by Stuart Curran. Ne\v York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986. Pr. ix + 265. $22.95. 
This is a richly informative book, wide-ranging in scope and lovingly de-
tailed in exposition, \vhieh sustains and is sustained by an argument that no 
scholar of Romanticism, British or Continental, can afford to disregard. \-Yith 
this argument-that we misinterpret the Romantic movement by supposing it 
to involve the dissolution of traditional genres-I shall wish to express mea-
sured disagreement on several counts, but with no intention of undercutting 
Curran's solid achievement. 
The sheer diversity of what he has done is best shown, perhaps, simply by 
listing, as a litany of praise, a few of his most instructive semi-detachable ar-
guments: One finds here the best pages yet written on Leigh Hunt, whom 
Curran treats as the first English Biedermeier poet, a pioneer in the conscious 
adaptation of bourgeois values to serious art. The "Whig political ode," dat-
ing from Collins and culminating in Shelley's finely-appreciated "Ode to Lib-
erty," is usefully isolated by Curran as a legitimate subgenre. In the chapter 
on "Pastoral," which is arguably the best, there is a splendid historical dis-
cussion of the "proletarian anti-pastoral" from Gay to Crabbe (this connec-
tion in itself bespeaks an impressive alertness to the affinity of oppositions) 
and then on to \-Yordsworth, "the greatest of England's pastoral poets," with 
fine readings of "Michael," the appropriate Lyrical Ballads, and much else. 
Perhaps most interesting of all is the emphasis Curran properly and origi-
nally places on the machinery of Robert Southey's quest-romances, which 
needed only to be rendered a little more subjective and suggestively obscure, 
he argues, to become the Visionary Cars of the major Romantic narrativcs 
and closet dramas. Anyone who has ever struggled to explain the litC'rJry-
historicill bJckground of J poems like Promcf/lclIs Un/ 101l11d or Cain to stu-
dents, knowing that it is not enough to cite the precedent of classicJI Jnd 
biblicJI machines, will disco\'cr in Curran's discussion of Southey a mystl'ry 
To turn to till' thesis which propels the::e Jnd the rcst of Curran's nbscf\'J-
til111S: he, Cun,ln, is r:lllti-Schlcgel and, more subtl~', Jnti-AbrJITIS, That j<." 
O\'l'r against the carl\' nineteenth-century Continental interest in the J1(l\,l'lis-
tic ,,\(,/;'11:: l!l1i1'n·~1i1I/. -\\'ith ,111 the polyglossal pan-gencric irony I1lndl'rn fl',hi 
crs suppose tl~ h,l\'l~ been disCll\'Cred by Bakhtin. and l~n)r a!~"jn.;~ \L I! 
:\l'ram<s c,lllllnical rL'adin~ (~f Romanticism ,1 .. a ml'ta],h:'sics, .1'- ,1 n'"i~u,lt](ln 
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of the subject vis-a-vis the object (leading to such pan-generic concepts as 
"natural supernaturalism" and "the greater Romantic lyric"), Curran main-
tains that the major poets of British Romanticism, not to mention the circu-
mambient literati of that era, continued to use the traditional literary "kinds" 
they inherited from the Humanists, the Pleiade, and the Neo-Classical writ-
ers in order to signal as precisely and intricately as possible their estrange-
ment from that very inheritance. Thus in place of any emphasis on the pan-
generic (the novelistic from Schlegel to Bakhtin, the "hieropoetic" [Michel 
Beaujour] from Navalis to Blanchot, the anti-Aristotelian from Plato to Der-
rida), and in studied neglect of these issues as one finds them discussed in 
L'Absolu litteraire (by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthes and Jean-Luc Nancy) and in 
a special issue of Glyph (7[1980]) he consigns to a footnote (p. 222), Curran 
proffers his own emphasis on the" countergeneric," with wonderful practical 
results, especially in the discussions of pastoral and rumance I have men-
tioned, but with considerably less theoretical success. 
In the first place, he runs the danger of oversimplifying period concepts. It 
is doubtful whether the Romantics themselves presented a solid front on this 
topic. Are Blake (for whom the genres conveniently modify the unvarying 
vocation of prophecy) and Wordsworth (whose pointed internalization of ge-
neric concepts constitutes an apology for the organization of his 1807 collec-
tion of poems) really to be understood as literary-historical allies of Cole-
ridge, Byron, Shelley, and Keats, whose versatile and exuberant adaptation of 
existing genres is unquestionably a shared trait and does indeed merit Cur-
ran's compensatory emphasis? More troublesome still is a tendency in Curran 
that one finds in all Period apologetics, namely, the need for a contrastive 
under-valuation of earlier periods: thus a Pope scholar will not gladly hear 
that the "hegemony of neoclassical rules, with their simpleminded and im-
possible clarity" (p. 8) awaited the sophistications of Romanticism to find 
their true justification. Even if we prOvisionally accept the hermeneutic guid-
ance of generic determinacy (the obvious practical value of which this book 
everywhere demonstrates), there remains the question whether this detenni-
nacy is best treated historically: granting the implausibility of a post-generic 
text, can we name any literary text worth thinking about that is not already 
counter-generic? It might be safer to isolate as an historical constant what the 
Russian Formalists called "parody" (within which generic reorientation may 
or may not be an aspect of change), a constant already firmly in place, as the 
best recent commentary shows, in Homer, Pindar, and Theocritus. 
But it is not in fact safe even proviSionally to promote generic Signals to a 
privileged place among the gUidelines for interpretation. What one then too 
frequently falls back upon is a wholly undemonstrable antinomy conceived 
as the tension between tradition (genre) and the individual talent (counter-
genre). Thus in sentences like "[i]t could be argued that the particular tradi-
tion associated with the pastoral elegy wholly determines the thrust of the 
poem, but that would be to deny Shelley'S creative independence and per-
sonal involvement in its issues" (p. 123), the rhetoric of scrupulously appor-
tioned latitude cannot conceal the sheer element of undecldability in the 
whole matter which is not just a local discomfort but in fact challenges any 
and all category-based approaches to interpretation. While there is something 
eXciting and suggestive in the epigrammatic assertion that Bryon's success in 
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Childe Harold "came not from his contemplating himself in the poem, but 
from his contemplating a genre in himself" (p. 157), the excitement is gnomic 
rather than clarifying; and the arbitrariness of the choice between initiative 
and regimentation becomes obvious when Curran writes, of The White Doe of 
Rylstone, "if there can be no question that [Wordsworth's] own suffering over 
the death of his brother John is reflected in the poem, the primary impulse 
behind it is generic" (p. 142). 
In the final chapter, this mediatory position expands into a thoroughgoing 
discussion of the liberation-in-constraint paradox. (Surprisingly little themati-
zation of form had been commented upon in the "Sonnet" chapter, where 
those self-referential sonnets of Wordsworth and Keats which insist on this 
very paradox were passed in review: is it accidental that Toussaint 
L'Ouverture is a "revolutionary leader of the newly independent Haiti now 
ironically languishing in prison" [po 47]?) But here more than ever an explicit 
theoretical model is called for. What finally constrains discourse? Extrinsic or 
"intrinsic" (Hirschian) genre? Personal feeling? Sociolect? And for Curran, 
moreover, who allows some room for all these determinants as occasion ar-
ises, to what extent can they be said to coexist without open conflict? 
The problem is largely resolved, as far as Curran himself is concerned, by 
his steady and extreme intentionalism. As he handles it, the notion of coun-
tergenre blossoms into a celebration of that conscious artistry which his read-
ings tautologically both assume and demonstrate. Together with the empha-
sis on genre one finds here an attempt to revive the Modernist discrimination 
among poetic personae, not as a means of rendering the poet irrelevant (as in 
Wimsatt and Beardsley) but rather as an expression-oriented (hence still "Ro-
mantic") confirmation of the poet's creative control. Plainly, a critic can be 
expected to invoke genres and personae alike with the forensic purpose of re-
futing doctrines of passive inspiration (as if that could not prove to be more 
rewardingly complex than any imaginable formal controU) or of the wild 
warbling of native woodnotes. And sometimes it works. But Romanticism is 
difficult to recognize when it is carried by critics who have assimilated their 
Pound and Yeats to extremes of Modernist craft, and it is just in the degree to 
which Curran does this, more here and less there, that one finds him more 
devoted to singing hymns in praise of artistic unity as such (his hidden 
agenda being a rebuke of current emphases on the disruption of form by in-
tractable forces) than to delineating the intentional structure of a certain body 
of literature. For him the rhetorical guarantor of formal control is "dialectic" 
(frequently the give and take between personae), a word he overuses at just 
those interpretive junctures where others today might overuse "mise en 
abi'me" or "aporia." 
Because Curran starts with formally definable genres and moves on to the-
matically definable and hence much more capacious-not to say baggy-
genres, the later chapters are less satisfying than the first ones. As one ap-
proaches something disarmingly called "Composite Genres" in the penulti-
mate chapter (The Prelude and Don Juan are reserved for this chapter, making 
the preceding chapter on "Epic" disappointingly thin), one comes to feel that 
the Germanic tripartition of genres into narrative, dramatic, and lyric which 
Curran had begun by rejecting would be at least as serviceable at this very 
general level and perhaps less in need of special pleading. After all, whatever 
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else one may say of it, "the modern critics's faith in an abstract lyrical mo-
ment" is at least as old as Goethe's notes to his West-Bstliche Divan and be-
comes canonical in Hegel, hence can scarcely be thought either anachronistic 
or "a spurious distillation from Romanticism" (p. 11). 
Not that special pleading is confined solely to those occasions when it has 
become obvious that to speak of genre and to speak of theme are the same 
thing: Wordsworth does not "misperceive" Gray's poem on the death of 
West even incidentally because he fails to grasp its °dynamics" as a sonnet 
(p. 30); and it is not helpful to say that '''the One Life within us and 
abroad'" is "the essential principle of pastoral" (p. 110; perhaps it is, but 
why then of pastoral only?). But these are increasingly petty cavils. Curran's 
is a grandiy conceived and elegantly sustained work, from the preliminary 
abecedarium of generic subtitles to the last gracenotes on the generic ency-
clopedism of Goethe. At its very strongest perhaps in the opening pages on 
historical background in each chapter, the book additionally furnishes an ex-
cellent and varied series of brief readings. Without inflation or grandiosity, in 
fact, Curran has found a way to write the sort of book surveying all the can-
onical Romantic writers that was every Romanticist's ambition at the time of 
Bostetter and the early Bloom but seemed to have been exhausted-as a 
genre-by Abrams. By his own example Curran proves the durability of 
kinds. 
Yale University Paul H. Fry 
Fictional Worlds by Thomas G. Pavel. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University 
Press, 1986. Pp. xii + 182. $20.00 
To readers of The Poetics of Plot (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1985), Pavel's most recent book may come as a partial surprise. The 
earlier book seemed content to work within the boundaries of narratology, 
refining some of its established models, tentatively taking plot grammar one 
step beyond the Proppian-structuralist legacy. Fictional Worlds tries to outstep 
the narratological domain entirely, relocating fiction theory "at the crossroads 
of literary criticism and philosophy" (p. 1). Pavel's plot grammar capitalized 
on those (trans)textual regularities that advanced thematics; Fictional Worlds 
openly critiques the structuralist quest of formal regularities or the kind of 
"mythocentric" emphasis that Pavel's own Poetics of Plot illustrated in part. 
The main polemical task in Fictional Worlds is to raise the "moratorium on 
representational topics" implemented by formalist poetics. 
But upon closer examination, the two books prove to be part of the same 
theoretical continuum. In The Poetics of Plot, Pavel opened the field of poetics 
to semantic concerns, examining the ontological and epistemic assumptions 
underlying plots in Renaissance dramas. His prime operational concept (that 
of move), inscribed Pavel's plot grammar in the praxical field where lingulstic 
regularities obtain in a complex interplay between social practices and indivi-
dualized tactical decisions. Fictional Worlds emphasizes even further this 
pragmatic aspect of fictionality, borrowing concepts from speech act theory, 
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modal logic and coordination games. The resulting perspective successfully 
foregrounds those aspects bracketed by structuralist poetics, but occasionally 
creates unwarranted repetition, repositing "problems" already solved (see 
Pavel's recourse to Kendall Walton's notion of reading as an act of "imper-
sonation" through a "fictional ego," where current psychonarratology and 
Rezeptionsasthetik have devised a more complex explanatory model of how 
readers project themselves into textual worlds). In his notable effort to reo-
rient narrative studies, Pavel is forced to overlook certain refinements in re-
cent narratology, or to sometimes collapse structuralism and poststructural-
ism, reducing them to formalist "textology." 
Pavel's immediate plea is for a nuanced integrationist approach to the 
question of fictional discourse and its boundaries. Taking issue with both the 
formalist and the Russellian versions of segregationism, that doggedly disso-
ciate "actual worlds" from "fictional" texts, Pavel attempts "to show that fic-
tional texts employ the same referential and modal mechanisms as nonfic-
tional uses of language, and that the logic of such texts is better understood 
when considered in relation to other cultural phenomena, in particular myths 
and religious beliefs" (p. 136). This thesis is backed up-and contradicted 
partly-by the claim that fictional discourse is best served by a kind of flexi-
ble, internal approach, that will make "the distinction between fictional and 
nonfictional lose some of its bluntness" (p. 53). 
In chapters 2 ("Fictional Beings"), 3 ("Salient Worlds") and 4 ("Border, 
Distance, Size, Incompleteness"), Pavel argues this point from various angles, 
convinced that rigid borderlines are not only counter-intuitive, but also his-
torically limited to our post-mythic, rationalistic period that sets fictions in 
opposition to reality "sub speciae veritatas." Pavel prefel;s a more archaic on-
tological model to this modern partitioning, one that postulates fluid bounda-
ries between the sacred (symbolical), and the actual and the fictional. He calls 
this model a "salient universe" and ascribes to it a dual, structure, with the 
"secondary" domain of the "make-believe world" standing for ("correspon-
ding" to ) the "primary" domain of the actual world. 
As upon other occasions, Pavel is first to point out the problematic areas in 
his composite model, derived from the possible world theories and their appli-
cations to the domain of fictionality. To begin with, the world of fiction may 
appear in this perspective as a weaker and degraded form of dual structure: it 
reverses the magico-mythic model which located the sacred space over and 
around the "actual," by subordinating fictionality to actuality. Fiction seems 
to lack that energy which, in the case of mythic rites, "may leave the fictional 
mode and cross the threshold of actuality," turning mimesis (mimicry) into 
"reality" (p. 60). And yet, a quick examination of Don Quixote leads Pavel to 
conclude that fiction may engage a much richer salient structure, with two 
concepts of "actuality" competing and no frame of reference finally prevail-
ing. What Pavel is less willing to concede, is that the "actual" and "fictional" 
may converge in a more essential way, both being narrative and ideological 
constructs; or that the fictional domain may strongly impact the "actual," dis-
placing or reversing the dual structure. 
Another problematic aspect involves the notion of "correspondence." After 
amending Plantinga's concept of strict correspondence between book and 
world, Pavel still defines reading as an allegorical operation that "relate/sl 
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each object in the story to some object in our world, by virtue of the relations 
of correspondence, whose role is to ensure the correct grasping of the struc-
ture of the secondary ontology as both different from and based upon the 
primary ontology" (p. 59). Here and elsewhere, Pavel grounds reading in a 
process of inference, without further inquiry into the difficulties a reader may 
encounter in "maximalizing" textual intentions and II construing" fictional 
worlds. He also ascribes a curious noninterventionist status to reading, or lo-
cates "the fictional exchange within the secure precincts of the imaginary 
worlds," with author and reader impersonating roles therein. 
This model of reading may suit some of Pavel's literary preferences: medi-
eval allegories, Renaissance dramas, realistic literature with its "remarkably 
courageous project" of bridging the gaps between actual and fictional worlds 
(p. 73). And yet Pavel cannot ignore those "puzzling" fictions that debilitate 
inference or "lay bare" the contradictions of fiction (and of "actuality," he 
might have added). Fictional worlds are best described as heterogeneous, 
mixed systems that "resemble the worlds of. . premodern, uneducated 
common sensei worlds where a highly structured central area is surrounded 
by increasingly dark, fuzzy spaces" (p. 95). Unlike the abstract "possible 
worlds" posited by analytic philosophy, fictional worlds cannot be expanded 
to their utmost limits. They are not entirely inferrable from the books that 
describe them. In one of the most captivating sections of the book, Professor 
Pavel "recapitulates" for us a "half-forgotten legend" on the relationship be-
tween fictional worlds and texts. His imaginative narration introduces us to a 
"fallen world" of texts that only fragmentarily reflect the fictional worlds out-
lined by the heavenly Books. In their "whimsical, inattentive and forgetful 
human" way, these amalgamated fragments gradually corrupt and supersede 
the "pure ontology" mapped by angelic scribes. "Heteronomy ... blurs the 
purity of correspondence between the texts and compendia," or "between 
worlds and heavenly books" (p. 70). It even throws some doubt on Pavel's 
title concept: the "fictional world" remains at best a utopian or abstract proj-
ect, always imperfectly reconstituted in the textual economy transacted by 
author and reader. 
Regretfully, the mythopoetic spirit infusing these pages is subdued in later 
chapters of Pavel's book that try to restore substance and teleological purport 
to the title concept. In equating fictional teleology with "the referential pur-
poses of fiction," Pavel draws heavily on speech act theory and the causal 
definition of names (Kripke, Kaplan, Donnellan), though again he dilutes 
these theoretical positions to fit the economy of fictional worlds. The result is 
an interesting critique of the problem areas in Searle's theory of assertions: its 
idealized locutionary rules, strictly governed by the axioms of existence 
("only what exists can be referred to"-Searle); the positing of a "well-indi-
vidualized," Cartesian subject-speaker "in full control of his voice ... ;" the 
marginalization of fiction as a form of "non-serious," "pretended" discourse 
(pp. 20-24). Pavel would like to set more fluid boundaries between the two 
discursive practices: "normal" and fictional discourse could thus be regarded 
as part of the same discursive continuum. But he steers clear of a more radi-
cal critique that would compromise, in Derridean fashion, the foundations of 
referentiality. He even wonders why Derrida takes issue with such a "more 
open-minded and tolerant variety" of logocentrism, even though a simple 
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observation like Searle's "It is after all an odd, peculiar and amazing fact 
about human language that it allows the possibility of fiction at all" (p. 27), 
could well put Pavel and the whole fiction-theory establishment out of busi-
ness. 
One of the test cases summoned by Pavel in support of his qualified theory 
of referentiality is that of miming: not unlike Derrida in "The Double Ses-
sion," he highlights the ambivalent relation between simulation and reality 
in the mime's performance. But two chapters later he rediscusses miming in 
stronger representational terms, pointing out how the mime's "body and 
movements, as they exist in the actual world, serve as a primary universe, as 
a foundation for the secondary universe in which the mime becomes the 
saintly priest blessing the crowd" (p. 60). Pavel is no Derridean deconstruc-
tor: he does not deem the fictional world powerful enough to trigger an "on-
tolOgical crisis" in the "base" or "actual" world. But the tension (distance) be-
tween the two worlds is not overlooked; a separate chapter (4 "Borders, Dis-
tance, Size, Incompleteness") investigates the creative potential of ontological 
distance and diversity. 
Pavel's own book maintains an active tension between a historicist ap-
proach (that sees fictions as secondary, demythicized versions of "salient 
structures") and an internal approach that emphaSizes the contribution of fic-
tional texts to an alternative ontology. Not surprisingly for someone who has 
experienced the paradox of "Central" European marginality, Pavel proposes 
a map of the imaginary in which "peripheric" fictions manage to challenge 
and renew the established ontological domain: '''Marginal' referential prac-
tices such as myth and fiction manifest the innovative side of referential 
processes and are perceived as marginal only in contrast to some culturally 
determined ossification into normality" (p. 27). Pavel's dynamics of "referen-
tial behavior includes a creative, risk-taking aspect, as well as a tendency to 
settle down into conventional patterns." 
Chapter 5, "Conventions," examines closer the second aspect: that of the 
canonization and regularization of fictional worlds. Chapter 6, "The Econ-
omy of the Imaginary," tries to redress the balance by focusing on the crea-
tive, functional aspects of fictionality. Instead of regarding fictions as fallen 
mythic worlds, "dwindling to a secondary reality," Pavel decides now to in-
tegrate them in the foreground of "ontological planning." By briefly consid-
ering Marlowe's Tamburlaine, Kafka's Cast/e, Borges's Aleph, etc., he rede-
signs his concept of ontological landscaping: what we see emerging now is 
not a carefully trimmed Elizabethan garden, but a kind of theoretical over-
growth, a composite remodeling of the world of fictionality. While testing 
such "unfriendly" texts "that introduce us to puzzling worlds, lead us to in-
adequate hypotheses, and encourage us to hesitate and to project a perplexed 
fictional ego" (p. 93), Pavel's fictional theory is forced back into "the dark, 
fuzzy areas." Fortunately Pavel's construction is sufficiently pliant and open-
ended to withstand such confrontations with "the unusual states of affairs" 
that go by the name of "fictional worlds." Pavel's book at its best purports to 
do what he recommends to postmodern fictionists: "acknowledge gracefully 
the difficulty in making sense of the world and still risk the invention of a 
completeness-determinacy myth" (p. 112). 
Harvard Center for Literary Studies Marcel Corms-Pop 
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Cinema I: The Movement-Image, by Gilles Deleuze. Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press. Pp. xiv + 242. $29.50 
This intriguing but difficult book is a translation of the first volume of a 
two-volume work on film by the well-known French philosopher Gilles De-
leuze. A translation of the second volume is promised by the publishers, and 
students of film owe them thanks for making available in English a strikingly 
novel contribution to their subject. 
In Cinema I, Deleuze announces his desire to break with the linguistic and 
quasi-linguistic models which have so dominated film studies for twenty 
years. Such a break is certainly welcome, and much that is best in the book 
derives, in part, from the author's willingness to rethink radically the issue of 
filmic signification. Nevertheless, it is disconcerting to discover that Deleuze 
proposes to provide an alternative conception of film and its connection to 
the world in terms of the metaphysics and epistemology of Henri Bergson. 
This is disconcerting because the Bergsonian views which Deleuze elaborates 
have been, since their first appearance, notoriously obscure and controver-
sial. Although Deleuze devotes a fair amount of space to the expositon of 
these views, it is fair to say, I think, that most of the standard, basic difficul-
ties are left untouched. 
For example, especially in Matter and Memory (Deleuze's principal source), 
Bergson proposes to dissolve the metaphysical dualism of mind and body 
and the epistemological dualism of idealism and realism by delineating an 
ontology of the "movement-image." There has been a widespread consensus, 
however, that the problematic character of these dualisms is simply inherited 
by the postulated nature of the movement-image. As a first approximation, a 
movement-image is the appearance of a segment of motion or change as it 
potentially presents itself to intuition. Leaving aside questions about Berg-
son's notion of "intuition," it should be noted that these appearances are 
conceived of as entities existing independently of any experience of them. In-
deed, mind and matter are held to be constructions out of this category of 
basic entities and the relations that hold between its members. Despite the 
essentially non-subjective nature of movement-images, their empirical quali-
ties are said to be directly present to the mind-they are the data of sensory 
awareness. It is easily seen from even this meager summary that various puz-
zles and paradoxes threaten imminently. Is it intelligible to reify appearances 
in this fashion? Can there be "images" which are both independent of and 
yet immediately given to the mind? Deleuze struggles a bit with these con-
cerns but does not succeed in easing the conceptual tensions. In the space of 
two pages (pp. 59-60) he identifies movement-images with "flowing matter," 
"blocs of space-time," and "lines and figures of light." Insofar as these char-
acterizations are clear at all, they are not equivalent to one another, and no 
one of them satisfies the conditions which define the movement-image. 
Beyond the difficulties concerning Bergson's philosophy, there is a global 
problem about how Deleuze means to exploit this system to construct his 
positive account of the cinematic image. In Chapter 2, it is asserted that the 
shot is a movement-image, but since shots are not bits of flowing matter, 
blocs of space-time, etc., the assertion is a gnomic one. On one reading: 1) 
The film image is, most immediately, a photographic image of movement-
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images. And, on a second: 2) The movement-image, as Bergson describes it, 
is an apt metaphor for the film image. Neither reading of Deleuze is obviously 
to be preferred. 
Interpretation 1) takes Bergson's metaphysics seriously and literally, and 
Deleuze is to be understood as contending that motion-picture photography 
has the capacity to extract and represent a framed set of local movement-im-
ages. 1) would therefore yield an ontology of the film image similar to Andre 
Bazin's except that, for Deleuze but not Bazin, the world is constituted out of 
movement-images. Interpretation 2) has the attractive feature of playing 
down the book's apparent commitment to Bergson's perplexing theses, and it 
proposes the working out of various possible analogies. The Bergson material 
is used, for instance, to explain how the shot, like the movement-image, is 
neither intrinsically subjective nor objective. It is not subjective because it 
does not represent the visual experience of a disembodied camera-observer, 
and it is not objective because it does not render the properties of things as 
they are independently of the mode of representation. The shot, on this con-
ception, presents the spectator with a momentary view of things-an inter-
subjective visual perspective. Such a view or perspective is not a slice of vis-
ual consciousness, but it is also not identical with the set of objects and 
events thereby on view. Rather, it is something like an array of visual infor-
mation-the information available at a designated point in space and time. 
Subjectivity and objectivity apply to film images only in virtue of their com-
plex expositional relations to the image-track which contains them. (See 
pp. 71-6). Naturally, this is just one example of the sort of analogy that can 
be devised and developed. Still, it is a major weakness of Deleuze's presenta-
tion that it is so difficult to discern the exegetical strategy he has in mind. I 
believe that the second approach promises more in terms of plausible results, 
but it is also harder to square with large segments of the text. 
The persistence of Deleuze's attempt to work within a Bergsonian frame-
work generates similar difficulties at almost every turn. Deleuze elaborates a 
division of movement-images into three categories: perception-images, affec-
tion-images, and action-images. Once again, the distinction derives from 
Bergson, but the nature of the derivation is confusing. For Bergson, these cat-
egories refer to stages of the sensory-motor process. The first and third refer 
to perception and physical action, the second to the mediating activities of 
the mind. Bergson speaks of the relevant states and processes as "images" 
only because they, like everything else, are ultimately constructions out of 
images. For Deleuze, on the other hand, although the basis of his categoriza-
tion is fuzzy, it is reasonably plain that the categories subsume film images. 
Very roughly, it seems that the perception-image is a film image which de-
picts a character's visual field; the affection-image (paradigmatically a close-
up of the human face) presents a bodily expression of feeling, motive, or 
emotion; and the action-image displays the unfolding of physical agency. 
However, it also appears that these categories are meant to be, as they are in 
Bergson's usage, mutually exclusive, and yet, this constraint will not be met 
by the conception described above. Suppose a movie melodrama includes a 
close-up of a character's hand as she convulsively reaches out and grasps a 
knife. Apparently, this shot will qualify both as an action and affection-im-
age, and, if the shot is presented in context as another character's view of the 
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action, then it will be a perception-image as well. The objection may depend 
upon a misunderstanding of Deleuze's intentions here, but the various ac-
counts he offers of his favored categories are not easy to reconcile with one 
another. 
There are sections of Cinema I where the Bergsonian architectonic becomes 
positively mystifying. In Chapter 5, for example, Deleuze claims that there 
are modes of filmic representation which correspond to what he calls "liq-
uid," "gaseous," and by implication, "solid" forms of perception. Unfortu-
nately, I am unable to offer any account of what these forms of perception 
are supposed to be, and one can only speculate as to the reasons for intro-
ducing them. It is as if Deleuze supposed that since matter arises from or 
is a facet of movement-images, and cinematic images are Uextracted from" 
movement-images, it follows that there should be systematic ties between 
film representation and the basic forms of matter. If reasoning of this sort 
were to become fashionable, we can expect to be reading the pre-Socratics as 
the true pioneers of contemporary film theory. 
Bergson's ouevre is not the only field which is mined for an exotic theoreti-
cal vocabulary. Cinema I is filled with a daunting range of terms from, e.g" 
Piercian semiotics, physics, and mathematics. Readers will continually find 
themselves stumbling over IIdemarks,li "'vectors/' "binomials," "points of ac-
cumulation," etc. and because Deleuze's employment of this vocabulary is, to 
say the least, whimsical, they will be littie aided by standard scientific dic-
tionaries. One has to question carefully whether Deleuze has evolved a fruit-
ful new set of cinematic concepts Of, in Wittgenstein's phrase, the seeds of 
the new jargon merely. 
Despite the serious reservations I've expressed, there is much in this vol-
ume to value. It is a major and continuing theme of Cinema I that film has 
the capacity to portray the world from a large variety of metaphysical and 
epistemological perspectives. Deleuze argues, for example, that human be-
havior and the situations in which it occurs can be fragmented and reassem-
bled on film into patterns with distinctive philosophical import, and that the 
shaping action of the world upon those patterns can be portrayed in radically 
diverse modes. Perhaps the most sustained discussion of such a possibility is 
found in the discussion of "naturalism" in Chapter 8, but to gain a sense of 
the diverSity of possibilities Deleuze envisages here, these sections should be 
read in conjunction with his analyses of Dreyer, Bresson and Eisenstein 
(early and late). Unlike a lot of recent film theory, Deleuze continually re-
turns to a wide spectrum of actual films in an attempt to show how his con-
ceptions illuminate their significance. If Cinema I is read simply as "Deleuze's 
Notes on Movies" it yields more suggestive proposals than almost any other 
comparable theoretical work. 
Predictably, the quality of the specific commentaries is somewhat uneven. 
Thusr we are infonned that UHitchcock produces a cinema of relationr just as 
English philosophy produced a philosophy of relation" (p. x). As a remark 
either about Hitchcock's films or about English philosophy (F. H. Bradley?) 
this is willfully arbitrary, and attributing a deltrious panpsychism to Vertov's 
The Man with a Movie Camera is unfortunate Bergsonian excess. But Deleuze 
has resonant suggestions to make about many of the major filmmakers, and 
he is often extraordinarily incisive about fine but relatively Iittie-known films 
like Nicholas Ray's Wind Across the Everglades (p. 135). 
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Cinema I makes arduous claims upon its readers, and a just assessment is 
not easy to reach. Such an assessment will have to deal with the issues I 
have tried to sketch and with related issues I have not had the space to men-
tion. The most distinctive feature of the book is its bold use of a large-scale 
metaphysical framework to explicate the fundamental attributes of film, and 
no evaluation can blink the questions raised by the problematic character of 
the metaphysics and by the elusiveness of the functions it is, in the present 
context, supposed to serve. Nevertheless, even in the absence of a final 
judgement on these matters, it is unquestionable that Deleuze, on film, is 
original, provocative, and prolifically suggestive. 
The Johns Hopkins University George Wilson 
Decomposing Figures: Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition by Cynthia 
Chase. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pp. ix + 234. 
$25.00 (hardcover). 
I suppose the worst one can say about Cynthia Chase's recent collection of 
essays, Decomposing Figures: Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition, is 
that throughout it seems deManically possessed. At times the book seems a 
companion volume to the late Paul de Man's work. The vocabulary, the fa-
miliar set of problems (for instance, "the conflict between positing and figur-
ation," p. 6), the by now no longer surprising conjunction of "rhetoric" and 
the "romantic tradition" in the subtitle of her book, all testify to the perva-
sive influence of a mentor. Of course, to compose a volume of essays that 
look occasionally as if they could have been written by Paul de Man is cer-
tainly no easy task, and I do not mean to detract from the considerable 
achievement of their author by branding her as an imitator. In fact, one of 
the triumphs of this book is that it manages to make frequent reference to de 
Man and to contain a generous sampling of quotations from his work with-
out seeming either slavishly imitative or parodic. In spite of the heavy in-
debtedness and the borrowed vocabulary ("aporia," "undecidability"), these 
essays possess a great deal of vigor. For the most part, the book seems fully 
alive (to use a metaphor that reverses the implications of the title), actively 
and intently engaged with texts in a series of readings whose scrupulousness 
and logical intensity should elicit admiration. Like de Man's work, Chase's 
shows us, by contrast, how hurried and uncritical is most of what passes as 
critical thinking and writing. In addition, many readers might find it reassur-
ing that in spite of his recent passing the spirit of de Man is alive and well, 
not only in the (presumably finite) number of posthumous books currently 
being issued in the University of Minnesota Press's "Theory and History of 
Literature" series, but also in the practice of a brilliant younger critic like 
Chase. 
Her voice is distinct from de Man's. At its best, it seems to me to combine 
the ludic quality of a Geoffrey Hartman with the rigor or argumentative te-
nacity of a de Man. In addition, she is constantly attentive to the status, the 
claims, the ruses, and the rhetoric of her own discourse, and in this respect 
she resembles Derrida more than she does de Man. 
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Unlike many critics who take as a starting point the work of de Man and 
Derrida, Chase does not merely mention their arguments, or accept as estab-
lished and authoritative the positions at which they have arrived. Most critics 
who cite Derrida and de Man-and we are now legion, no longer an embat-
tled minority-do so partly to avoid responsibility for working through their 
positions with the scrupulousness, care, and rigor that they invariably exer-
cise. Most contemporary criticism that is satisfied with simply making ges-
tures toward their work, and many of the recently penned "primers" on de-
construction, give no indication why reading Derrida and de Man should or 
can be exhilarating. Chase, however, like de Man, works through, in a care-
ful and rigorous fashion, the contradictory logic that informs texts. Unlike 
most criticism, which favors the shortcut, Chase seems to take delight at the 
prospect of another "detour ahead/' another country road to explore in her 
constantly ramifying arguments. 
Occasionally she aims in her close encounters with de Man's work to move 
beyond the positions last established by the master, particulary in Chapter 4, 
an essay on de Man's use of prosopopoeia (and the only piece appearing in 
this collection that has not previously appeared elsewhere), and in Chapter 6, 
which attempts to move beyond de Man's own reading of Kleist's "On the 
Marionette Theater" in The Rhetoric of Romanticism by reading that narrative 
in the company of another short piece of Kleist, "Improbable Veracities." But 
Chase pursues that "beyond" only in a limited sense, for she always works 
in these essays within the limits of the critical vocabulary and general prob-
lematics of romantic texts identified by de Man. Many of the texts chosen for 
analysis are themselves, in a sense, chosen by de Man (Rousseau, Words-
worth, Kleist), although Chase also demonstrates the continuity between the 
problema tics of romantic texts and texts that seemingly lie "outside" the ro-
mantic tradition: George Eliot's Dalliel Deronda, for instance, or Freud. 
The apparently necrological title refers to an episode in Book 5 of Words-
worth's The Prelude, which Chase reads in her inaugural chapter. A drowned 
man's "ghastly face" rises to the surface of a lake, and Wordsworth describes 
its recovery "in a bare, literal language setting it apart from the adjacent pas-
sages" (p. 14). The language in which the episode is described, no less than 
the corpse that bobs to the surface of Esthwaite Lake, is "disfigured." The 
apparently bare or literal language in which Wordsworth tells his tale, di-
vested of figurative meaning as the drowned man has been divested of the 
"unclaimed garments" Wordsworth sees on the opposite side of the lake, "is 
revealed as effaced figure, rather than a primary, integral, proper condition of 
language" (p. 22). This episode Chase takes to be exemplary of a difficulty 
that informs the reading of all romantic texts: "an erosion of the distinction 
between literal and figurative modes" on which the recovery of meaning and 
the very possibility of reading depend (p. 14). "An exacerbated sense of the 
problelll of figurative language" that Chase, like de Man, associates with the 
rom<1ntic tradition leads, according to Chase, to the romantic motif or trope 
of disfiguration. This motif derives from the romantics' discovery of "the im-
possibility, coincident with the status of language as rhetoric or figure, of fix-
ing il figure's referential status" (p. 6), and from a subversion of intentionality 
in rom<1ntic texts that blocks "the emergence of any recognizable 'face' or fig-
ure ilS the origin or form of a literary work" (p. 5). In her subsequent read-
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ings of texts by Rousseau, Wordsworth, Baudelaire, Hegel, and Keats, Chase 
locates similar moments in which the logic of figure is disrupted. 
The second part of the book, devoted to readings of narrative texts by 
Kleist, George Eliot, Freud, and Baudelaire/Rousseau, develops the notion of 
what Chase terms "the double reading of narrative." A narrative text de-
mands to be read in two contradictory ways, or according to a double lOgic. 
George Eliot's Daniel Deronda, for instance, presents itself "not only as a his-
tory of the effects of causes but also as a story of 'the present causes of past 
effects'" (p. 157; that last phrase appears in a letter that Deronda's friend 
Hans Meyrick writes). In other words, the first (and more familiar) logic of 
narrative presents events as the effects of causeSj .a second, interfering logic 
shows "causes" to be brought about, in a sense, by the events it will purport 
to explain, its "effects." "Causes" are necessitated by the novel's pursuit of 
narrative coherence; thus, they are only apparently antecedent facts or 
causes. They may as justly be termed effects of effects. 
While reading Chase's deconstructions of narrative texts in the final four 
chapters of her book, I found myself wishing for more direct confrontations 
with the exploding discipline of narrative theory. Perhaps this confrontation 
with other theoretical discourses could not take place within Chase's text be-
cause of her own theoretical disposition to distrust the status of disembodied 
theory, theory that, because it is divorced from encounters with texts, is usu-
ally unaware of problems posed by its own tropes and figures. After defining 
her term "disfiguration" toward the beginning of her book, Chase writes in 
justification of her own method: "It is inherently misleading to discuss and 
define disfiguration in this way, making abstract, ostensibly literal assertions 
about effects of interference with assertion or represent~tion. It must be en-
countered instead by way of readings that attend to the vicissitudes of partic-
ular tropes" (p. 6). 
Still, I kept wishing for a placement of these deconstructions of narrative in 
the context of other critical discourses, and perhaps Chase's exceptional work 
on narrative in this collection will lead in this direction. It is easy enough to 
imagine Chase's response to a semiotics that is concerned with constructing a 
grammar of narrative; such a grammar in the case, say, of Daniel Deronda 
would be undermined by the text's opposition to its own logic. But other 
questions arose as I began to pay attention to the narrative elements of 
Chase's own essays. There appeared to be a greater narrative element in the 
four chapters that were explicitly about narrative. They achieved some of the 
fluidity of narrative that the first chapters of the book seemed so deliberately 
to avoid. The first five chapters on figure and voicer in their continual hesita-
tionsr qualificationsr involutions and self-correctionr like much deconstructive 
criticism appear to be resisting the logic of narrative. How strongly anti-nar-
rative they are may be gathered by their resistance to paraphrase (they are 
like de Man's work in this respect). They seem uneasy in the knowledge that 
it is not possible to write a sentence that is not itself a miniature narrative. Is 
there a greater antagonism, or on the contrary a greater complicityr between 
narrative and deconstructive criticism than there iSr saYr between narrative 
and structuralist criticism? In other words, is deconstructive criticism itself 
more narrativistic than most forms of structuralist analysis? Is temporality a 
more insistent feature of deconstructive criticism than it is of structuralist 
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analysis? What lies beyond the recognition of. the extent to which the exigen-
cies of syntax and the binary, differential character of language enforce a.nar-
rative logic? These essays seem more self-critical when they concern them-
selves with figure and voice (the paradigmatic axis of discourse) than when 
they discuss syntax or the syntagmatic axis of discourse (causality in narra-
tive, for example), perhaps because it is less plausible to unmask the logic of 
one's own syntax than it is to deconstruct the logic of figuration informing 
one's critical discourse, and still remain at a comfortable distance from si-
lence. 
The influence of deconstruction on academic criticism in this country has 
been so widespread that it has all too quickly lost much of its alternative sta-
tus. Consequently, an important collection of essays like this one is in danger 
of not receiving the attention it fully merits. Like the essays of de Manf how-
ever, these deserve to be closely read and rereadf and they will not soon be 
superseded. They also demonstrate, at a time when the marketplace is being 
inundated with pallid works about deconstruction, that deconstructive criti-
cism, when practiced as skillfully as it is here, remains exhilarating. 
Eastman School of Music Jonathan Baldo 
The Tain Of The MirraI': Derrida And The Philosophy Of Ref/ection, by Ro-
dolphe Gaschi'. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986. 
Pp. x + 348. 
Gasche has tried in this ambitious and rich book to present Derridean de-
construction as a coherent system that exceeds philosophy precisely by being 
so philosophically rigorous that it ends by encompassing philosophy. Now, 
as soon as that is said it needs to be seriously qualified, since the notion of 
"encompassing" philosophy could easily be conceived as the most traditional 
of philosophical projects. Philosophy in its most ambitious forms has always 
sought the deepest ground, the most universal conditions of possibility, etc. 
Gasche understands that it is therefore necessary to qualify the deconstruc-
tive picture of the "conditions of possibility" of philosophy in such a way as 
to show that this picture is not just a new, deeper foundation but that it in 
fact renders impossible the foundationality of any foundation. The distinctive 
value of GaschO's book is the scrupulosity with which he details the way in 
which deconstruction at once "grounds" philosophy and shows that the con-
cept of a ground is untenable. Gasche limits himself to the arena of post-
Kantian philosophy from Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel to Husserl and Heideg-
ger (certainly more than enough for anyone book to attempt), and within 
these limits he succeeds to an impressive degree in demonstrating the preci-
sion of Derrida's analyses and the philosophical pertinence of his project. 
At the sam~ time, and as if to act out the Derridean scenario so well de-
scribed by Gasche himself, according to which the condition of a thing's pos-
sibility is at the same time and for the same reason its condition of impossi-
bility, Gasche's account is as profoundly misleading as it is insightful. Gasche 
must show the philosophical pertinence of Derrida's work in a philosophi-
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cally disciplined way, so as to show that the teeth of Derrida's concepts do in 
fact engage with the cogwheels of philosophical conceptuality, and don't just 
spin idly somewhere off on a "literary" side-street. But to the precise degree 
that he succeeds in proving this engagement on the basis of philosophically 
respectable arguments, Gasche reduces the radicality and force of Derrida's 
work. Derrida's more "literary" interpreters (as well as Richard Rarty), of 
course, have fallen afoul of the converse of this dilemma: they have empha-
sized the radical character of deconstruction at the cost of making it seem 
largely irrelevant to philosophy (at least as philosophy is conceived by many 
of those who actually practice it). 
The juxtapositon of these two alternatives suggests that neither a simply 
pholosophical nor a simply literary approach can do justice to Derrida' 5 over-
all strategy. Gasche soundly reprimands the literary critics for not having un-
derstood deconstruction philosophically, and the chapters in which he does 
so (Ten and Eleven) are essential reading for all students of deconstruction; 
but by distancing himself so thoroughly from the literary problematic of the 
text, he deprives himself of any way out of the dilemma I have described. In-
terestingly, as we shall see, the door which Derrida opens between philo-
sophical and literary textuality Gasche leaves closed because of a strictly phil-
osophical mistake in his reading of Husserl. 
The thesis of Gasche's book is that the system of Derridean deconstruction 
is organized around a set of what Gasche, picking up hints from Derrida, 
calls "infrastructures." These infrastructures are what is named by the famil-
iar Derridean terms "differance," "iterability," "supplementarity," and so on. 
In what is perhaps the most valuable chapter of the book, Chapter Nine, "A 
System Beyond Being," Gasche discusses each of the major infrastructures in 
turn and then shows how the "general system" of the "chain" of infra-
structures can be formulated in terms of a "general theory of doubling:" 
... if one considers that iterability, for instance, as a necessary possibil-
ity constitutive of idealities, "produces" as much as it "presupposes" 
alterity; and that the necessary possibilities of supplementarity, differ-
anee, and arche-traee broach the identity of a full instant, entity, or 
moment by establishing an other, a double opposite to them, then du-
plicity must appear to be a major feature of all infrastructures. (p. 255) 
We need to see the generality of the principle of doubling because it is the 
principle that strikes at the root-thought of metaphysics in all its forms, the 
thought of that which is as the thought of something simple and self-present. 
For Derrida, doubling is not something that subsequently befalls a moment 
of original simplicity, but that belongs to it originarily. This originary dou-
bling is anterior to any dialectical exteriorization, and on Derrida's analysis, 
the other of the selfsame is not dialectically reappropriable (p. 228). 
So far so good. Gasche is not the first to emphasize these points, but his 
exposition untangles and systematizes them with a care I have not seen else-
where. However, at this point a certain ambiguity or vagueness begins to 
creep into Gasche's exposition, an ambiguity or vagueness which is sympto-
matic of the way in which Gasche's whole reading of Derrida is a misread-
ing. 
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The problem is most visible in relation to Gasche's remarks on Husser!' 
The problem of appearing and appearance in Husserlian phenomenology is a 
notorious thicket, and Derrida himself has gone out of his way on more than 
one occasion to pay tribute to the complex articulation of Husserl's analysis. 
But at this crucial point in his exposition, where Gasche is explicating the 
most general pertinence of the principle of doubling to classical concepts of 
entity and its appearing he glides past the Husserlian problematic of the ap-
pearing of the phenomenon with a few sentences, and those rather puzzling. 
The whole Husserlian problematic is reduced to the idea that phenomena 
have "the quality of appearing as themselves to themselves" (p. 229). Here 
now is the sentence in which Gasche sums up and draws his deconstructive 
conclusion: 
Derrida argues, however, that this difference [between appearing and 
appearance] is preceded by the originary duplication of which it is but 
a trace, since the movement of the self-presentation of the phenome-
non in pure appearing, in presenting itself as such to an intuitive con-
sciousness, already presupposes a movement of doubling without 
which the appearing could not relate to itself (pp. 229-30). 
Gaschi' here gestures at the Husserlian problematic of the presentation of 
phenomena for a consciousness, hut he curiously undercuts this schema, ap-
parently under the influence of Hegel, by referring to the phenomenon in 
terms of self-relation. And this enables him, then, to claim that Derrida de-
constructs the Husserlian schema by simply pointing to this self-relation of 
the phenomenon which precedes its presentation to a consciousness: "In 
other words, in order to present itself as such, the phenomenon must already 
have divided itself" (p. 230). 
This account subtly misstates the articulation of Husserl's schema and does 
so in a way that makes possible a telling avoidance of what Derrida himself 
emphasizes in his intervention into this schema. Gasche obscures the strictly 
phenomenological character of appearing by speaking of a self-relation of the 
phenomenon prior to its appearing. But if Husserlian ideal objectivities (what 
Gasche calls "phenomena") are, as Derrida argues, split in their essence, it is 
not because they must appear "to themselves" but because they must be cap-
able of appearing for consciousness, of being "repeated" indefinitely many 
times in any number of acts of consciousness by any number of rational sub-
jects. (That there is genuine confusion in Gasche's account of Hussed here is 
suggested by his earlier remark that Husserl assumed a reell connection be-
tween reflection and its objects (p. 20). Nothing could be more contrary to 
the spirit of phenomenology, from the time of the "Prolegomena to Pure 
Logic" onward, than such a connection, which would be merely psychologi-
cally real rather than ideally valid.) 
The fact that Gaschi' does not clearly articulate this relation of ideality to 
transcendental subjectivity in phenomenology is symptomatic of the basic 
problem with his whole account, which is that he does not make it clear that 
deconstruction does not apply to beings and to Being but to the constitution 
of "beings" and "Being" in philosophical texts. This is the meaning of Derri-
da's "reduction of the reduction," which he describes in his Introduction to 
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Husserl's Origin of Geometry as "attentiveness to the 'fact' of language in 
which a juridical thought lets itself be transcribed, in which juridicalness 
would like to be transparent" (p. 70 n.). Gascho is, we could say, transfixed 
by the "juridicalness" of Derrida's thought and fails to pay the necessary at-
tention to its textuality. 
Gasche is correct when he argues in Chapter Ten that "writing" and "text" 
have a strict sense in Derrida's philosophical work that cannot be reduced to 
"literariness" in the ordinary sense, but he is wrong to drive such a deep 
wedge between the "quasitranscendental" (as he usefully terms it) sense of 
writing and its contemporary literary sense. 
Husserl's phenomenology is the essential midway point between the clas-
sical philosophical analysis of entity and the deconstructive analysis of the 
textuality of philosophical analysis because in "reducing" the entity to its 
phenomenological manifestation Husserl implicitly "textualized" it, as Der-
rida has shown (in Speech and Phenomena and the essay "Form and Mean-
ing"). The structure of ideality in Husserl turns out, on Derrida's view, to be 
the structure of signification; and this is how the problematic of language and 
textuality forces its way into the center of the philosophy of presence. Der-
rida has stated the significance of the structure of the sign as forcefully as it 
can be stated: the sign is "the sole 'thing' which, not being a thing, does not 
fan under the question 'what is ... ' (Speech and Phenomena, p. 25). Briefly: It 
is part of the "essence" of the sign that it must be repeatable, but all ideali-
ties must be repeatable as well, since this repeatability is the condition of 
their objectivity (that is, their in principle availability to new acts of con-
sciousness in which they would appear). Therefore repeatability turns out to 
infect the entire field of ideality, and shows that this field is constituted by 
signitive doubleness rather than by the singleness of self-identical ideality. 
But the repeat-ability of the sign, though described as part of the "essence" 
of the sign, is not a self-relation; rather, it belongs to the sign because the es-
sence of the sign is constituted by its relation to a consciousness for which it 
would appear. Gasche closes off the opening of this problematic at the crucial 
moment, without even mentioning the question of the sign, and when he 
comes around to speak of writing and text it will only be in the transparent 
and juridical form of the "quasitranscendentals." 
Let it be said once more that Gasche takes the most meticulous care imag-
inable to characterize the quasitranscendentals in a way that rigorously main-
tains their distinctness from any strictly metaphysical construct. Yet Gasche 
in doing this never lifts his eyes from the conceptual interior of the structure 
Derrida constructs. 
Now, it is true that Derrida himself has on a number of occasions made 
declarations that appear to show that he thinks of "differance" and his other 
inventions as "infrastructures" that are more powerful and more encompass-
ing than the structures of philosophy, and that they "constitute" these struc-
tures or are "conditions of possibility" that underlie them, and not only has 
he made such declarations, but much of his writing has sought to make good 
on them. 
This gesture must, however, be understood rhetorically or performatively, 
that is, as a situated utterance, with a certain local context and another, larger 
context; or say, in reference to its stagillg. In this phase of his work, Derrida is 
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making war against philosophy, and more to the point, against the texts of 
specific philosophers, and he plays the philosopher in so doing. I don't mean 
Derrida doesn't really mean it, a view Rarty has been pushing-I mean the 
phrase here with the weight that "play" has in Montaigne's "to play the 
man." To my mind, Derrida plays the philosopher as well as he has ever 
been played-and the great merit of Gasche's book is to show us just how he 
has done it. But in heeding Derrida's agon with philosophy we run the risk of 
forgetting the staging of this struggle, forgetting that philosophy is a genre of 
writing and that Derrida in writing philosophy, and in obeying (up to a 
point) the law of genre, is doing what any good writer must do in relation to 
whatever genre he chooses to write in. 
There is operative here something that we could call the fatality of writing, 
a fatality some of whose aspects have been powerfully evoked by Paul de 
Man in the final chapter of Allegories of Reading in terms of the heedless com-
pulsion of what he calls the "machine" of grammar. It is absolutely indis-
pensable to remain aware of this textual compulsion when we read Derrida's 
most decisive statements of mastery over metaphysics, as in this passage 
quoted by Gasche: "At the edge of Being, the medium of the hymen never 
becomes a mere mediation or work of the negative; it outwits and undoes all 
ontologies, all philosophemes, all manner of dialectics" (Dissemination, 
p. 215; cited by Gascho, pp. 286-7). If we do not keep this in mind, we will 
read Derrida in a way that makes him vulnerable to the charges brought by 
Rorty that this is just more metaphysics. When Derrida reads Heidegger and 
goes him one better and Gasche recounts to us how Derrida does it, we must 
remember that so far we are still within the staging of philosophicallogoma-
chaeia, and no amount of precautions of the sort Gasche takes to explain in 
what way deconstruction exceeds classical metaphysics will suffice to wrench 
us out of this staging. That is why Derrida speaks of "double writing", an 
expression I believe Gasche completely misinterprets. Gasche takes the sec-
ond "gesture" of writing to be identical with what Derrida calls the "second 
phase" of deconstruction, the phase of re-inscription; in Gasche's terms, this 
phase would be that of the production of the infrastructures (pp. 112-3). 
But the second kind of writing of which Derrida speaks is not the produc-
tion of infrastructures: the infrastructures are the "hymen" between the lan-
guage of philosophy and the Nietzschean, Battaillean, Blanchotian writing, 
the post-transcendental text that would flourish outside the house of Being. 
And this other writing does not simply lie beyond philosophy, as what can 
happen after the philosophical phase of deconstruction-so that one could 
give a complete account of the philosophical pertinence of deconstruction, as 
Gasche has done, without ever mentioning it or drawing on its resources; the 
infrastructures join as well as separate the two writings. The second kind of 
writing is the necessary supplement of philosophical deconstruction in the 
fullest Derridean sense of "supplement" and as such inhabits and overflows 
the interior of philosophical deconstruction. 
In order to evoke the overflowing of metaphysics that Derrida's writing cn-
ac/s, the commentary on Derrida must itself engage in a measure of enact-
ment, a measure of overflowing. 
Finally, the most striking aspect of Gasche's reading of Derrida is its style, 
its tonality, which rejects ail such enactment. No other writer on deconstruc-
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tion has achieved such a colorless tone-the tone of the mouthpiece of truth. 
And yet, at a time when nothing is more common than the miming of figures 
of enactment by writers under the influence of Derrida, this tonality is in a 
way the book's most impressive achievement. The voice in this book has 
great integritYi this writer has worked hard and speaks with well-earned as-
surance; it is a voice that echoes with what Blanchot calls "the glorious soli-
tude of reason." 
Gasche's style is thus in its own wayan enactment, though not of a decon-
structive type. In its very faithfulness to the specificity and precision of the 
(trans)philosophical infrastructures within Derrida's text, Gasche's book acts 
out a certain warfare on this text itself, and gains a certain victory over it. 
This has been immediately noticed. In the blurb on the inner sleeve of the 
dust jacket of Gascho's book, Wlad Godzich awards GaschO the palm: 
"Gasche's steadiness of purpose never wavers and his clearness of mind pre-
vails over Derrida's textual and scriptorial acrobatics." 
University of Wah Henry Staten 
Literature and History: Theoretical Problems and Russian Case Studies edited by 
Gary Saul Morson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986. Pp. 332. 
$37.50. 
There seem to be three premises to this volume, a collection of essays pro-
moting a current "return to history" by literary criticism -from textualist con-
cerns: that the Slavicist theoretical model, long slighted, is of particular rele-
vance to American criticism (and should even edge the French competition); 
that the frontier of criticism is bound to the revived authority of history; and 
that these essays represent the cutting edge of this scene. Each is problem-
atic, and each seems questioned by the essays themselves. In the first in-
stance, it may seem to the reader that the most formalistic or precisely ahis-
torical aspects of Slavic theory are drawn from-invocations of models, sys-
tems, typologies, and non-interpretive or quasi-statistical sketches. In the 
second, while the "prestige" of history appears considerable, one senses a 
Falstaffian opportunism in the editor's allusion to it: here "history," hyper-
literal, seems without any social or critical agenda and risks becoming more 
of a buzz-word than any Derrideanism it was invoked to counter. And third, 
as most contributions are from more senior scholars (Fanger, Peckham, Belk-
nap, Greene, Holquist), and two from historians proper, the promise of a 
"radically revisionary" (p. 30) perspective seems at best hallucinatory. The 
collection might be best regarded as reflecting a problem in the word history 
as it is now used. 
The pieces included do not form a unified field, of course, and I will limit 
myself to discussing those that seem to demonstrate an agenda as I see it. An 
exemplary reading of canonical mutations in Milton criticism by Stanley Fish 
(used, one feels, as a "relativistic" straw man by the editor) and a quasi-Der-
ridean incantation on "The Historical Unconscious" by Arkady Plotnitsky are 
juxtaposed to Jakobsonian graphs, applications of Bakhtinian typologies by 
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Katerina Clark, and theoretical divagations by Thomas Greene (on literary 
anachronism) and Michael Holquist (on a now familiar opposition of Bakhtin 
to Derrida, where the latter is to learn the way of the social text). If there is a 
unifying theme it may be imposed by the editor's policing intent: "How are 
we (or for that matter, should we bother) to meet the challenges of exfreme 
interpr 'ive relativism?" (p. 28). In fact, when the epilogue is turned over to a 
professional historian (Richard Wortman) literary theory itself abdicates and 
Wortman critiques it, as outsider, precisely for not having a narrative (or evo-
lutionary) telos. In continuing to recommend the "book" as social fact rather 
than as text, it seems the reaction against textuality has resulted in a sheer 
slippage, or regression. 
An aspect of the presentation requires note: not only are there three sub-
divisions ("Literary Institutions," "Controlling the Play of Meanings," and 
"Narrative and the Shape of Events"), but each is preceded and superseded 
by unusually generous editorial commentary that takes a tone bordering sur-
veillance or "controlling the play of meanings." This last theme is even en-
dorsed biologically by Peckham's romantic behaviourism where a calcuiation 
of redundancies would apparently entrap repetition ("we will be able to use 
redundancies even more effectively in our ambition to establish controls over 
interpretational uncertainty" [po 190]), and no idea is allowed to proceed 
unexplained or unplaced by the editor. Thus a wide-ranging piece by 
Thomas M. Greene on literary anachronism is praised as "unafraid to reject 
current orthodoxy" (p. 268), while Fish is repeatediy rebuked for his relativist 
contradictions and "'internalist' premise" (p. 126) (what demonstrates "how 
to go beyond" Fish is called "immensely sensitive to the facts that institu-
tions do not develop in isolation" yet turns out to be William Mills Todd Ill's 
overarching and formalized exercise in the brave new world of the Jakob-
sonian sexpartite model, "Literature in Early-Nineteenth-Century Russia"). 
Donald Fanger explores a Ncounter-model" to the Russian writer in the ase-
manticist Sinhavsky that inversely confirms the misleading cliche of the al-
ways engage Russian, while Katerina Clark's appropriation of Bakhtin's 
chronotope demonstrates the hazards of relfying Bakhtin's anti-tropes, here 
rehabilitating socialist realism and democratizing genre: "socialist realism, lf 
defined as a tradition built on a distinctive chronotope, is not dead. The 
chronotope has become a national tradition and has, potentially, something 
for everyone" (p. 246). 
One might here recall that academic slavicists have uniquely failed to 
make the great texts they preside over relevant to recent debates (no doubt a 
deeply felt lack). Their attempt to captur~ a moment on center stage (or at 
least more clout) in the wake of Bakhtin's popularity becomes a potential 
subtext, here, and merges smoothly with the trend toward social criticism. 
Thus in "The Surd Heard," Michael Holquist's opposition of Bakhtin to Der-
rida might appear emblematic in a double sense, conveniently involving the 
codes of Russian/French as that of SocialfTextual. Yet if Holquist's reading 
of Derrida is avowediy second-hand (including growls at Derrida's "epi-
gones"), his reading of Bakhtin appears in ways already antiquated. One is 
reminded that the Bakhtin the slavicists have produced as an ideolOgical bul-
wark against the French under the literal reading of "dialogue" may be a 
weak and rather emasculated one. Holquist's Bakhtin is itself based on a 
CriticislJl, Vol. XXX, No. 1: Book Reviews 151 
strategy of legitimation oriented toward positing meanings, selves, hermetic 
sources and (biographical) originals that have made the slavicists the less 
than disinterested "priests" of Bakhtin's word. Thus the "social" of the Rus-
sian is supposed to expand and supplement pop deconstructive epithets, 
while Holquist commodifies a conceit of "self" follO\ving Todorov's Buber-
esque misreadings of dialogue. Oddly, the social, which for Bakhtin signals a 
sheer and violating exteriority, is used, here, for a strategy of interiorization. 
The "self" as commodity promotes a recuperative economics consuming the 
other in haphazard formulas: "In Freud, the more other, the less self; in 
Bakhtin, the more other, the more self" (p. 148). Among the several contra-
dictions of the volume~purveying old models as "revisionist," formalism as 
historical, institutional statistics as the social~that of a rhetoric of interiority 
wrapping itself, vine-like, about the very terms that threaten it (such as the 
Bakhtinian "social") seems most emblematic. 
Thus when Holquist cites Volosinov's early text on the utterance "Wel1!" ~ 
the model of the discourse scenario~he fails to note where its depiction of 
utterance as apostrophe makes "dialogue" a theatrical pretext concealing nn 
agonistic series of power plays rather than hermeneutic "immediacy" or 
"shared being." Bakhtin becomes the signature of a false totalization ("an 
expressive totality, if not an all-encompassing unity" [po 155]), marketable as 
a compromise (he rests, we hear, "between the specter of an absolute ab-
sence. . and the dream of an absolute presence" [po 147]). Yet the moral 
tone persuasively recommending "experience" over the bad infinity of tex-
tuality fails to see where just the materiality of Bakhtin's "sign" precedes and 
suspends the trope of experience (as Volosinov makes clear, one reason his 
signature must be rewritten as "Bakhtin"). Here "the social" and "history" 
have become polemic devices, and the ever vigilant Morson rebukes Holquist 
with a Johnsonian bluntness that distracts us from another conceptual void: 
"the way to think socially is to think sOcially, not to think philosophically 
about the need to think socially" (p. 195). 
Interiorization returns in Thomas Greene's treatment of "anachronism," 
which demonstrates the price of not having a conception of figure. Greene 
cites Yeats' final poem, "The Black Tower," yet \vhere the tower must be 
read first as an emblem of emblematic language standard in the tradition of 
Shelley and Stendhal, Greene "historically" explJ.ins the opposition of the 
warriors' oath and the voice's "old bones" as "Yeats' epitaph for himself and 
his few friends, skeletal relics defending withered codes of integrity in an nge 
of timeservers" (p. 214). The historical interpretation here yields a non-read-
ing more self-mirroring than the textual "narcissism" it disa\'ows ("clain'oy-
ant toward his own outdated quixotism but harsher toward the modern age 
that dismisses his rigidity" recalls Morson's praise of a Greene "una(rZlid to 
reject current orthodoxy" [po 268]). Here it is the description of Proust th<1t is 
telling: "A la recher-che rill temps perdu in effect dehistoricizes time by locating 
its pO\\'er within the private sensibility" (p. 219). Such priI'ali:atioll appears 
to reify interiorization as a humanistic icon, now privatized, \'oid of history. 
Greene's final analogy seems decisive, particul,nly \\'here "anachronism" 
st<1ges nothing but comedies: "To st<1ge a traged~' of Jl1<1chronism is perhaps 
the most effective way of exorcising it. just as for the critic, perhaps, spe<1king 
<1bl'lut (ll'solcscencc b a defense against becoming obs('I1cscent" (p. 220). The 
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anachronistic model of uanachronism" becomes universaIizedl and effaced, 
as a potential device of control, a literalized perspectivism, itself of the' "filthy 
modem tide" it would defend against. 
In a shift from professionalism to prophecy, Stanley Fish predicts a future 
of (Miltonic) criticism as a return to typologies, the reaction to the aesthetici-
zation in the influx of minorities into the IIprofession/' and an ethics of com-
mitment intolerant of "disinterested inquiry." Such would be of a piece with 
the odd intellectual Reaganism subtending much of the collection-neo-his-
toricist and neo-conservative gestures confusing the pretexts of facts with 
"history" and controlled explanation with engagement, views seldom unre-
warded by the professional establishment. One could be excused for depict-
ing the editor's ethos as that of a Meese Commission report on "history," 
sharing its predecessor's literalist dilemma: if the hyperreal of pornography 
eludes the conceptual definition, one might say the same for "history." 
While one might legitimately respond to the advances of textualist claims, 
those need not include a retreat from the text to the "book," the invocation 
of formalist "systems" in place of reading per se, or blind appeal to the iconic 
protection of the historical or its supposed relevance. The collection reminds 
us of a contradiction in the easily appropriated pass-word "history" and how 
much truly aggressive labor is needed to make oneself historical. Moreover, it 
allows us to look foreward to a reading of Bakhtin shorn of the priest-like 
emasculations of his slavicist guardians, and where his figure of the "social" 
is historically read apart from our recuperations as closer to what Jean Baud-
rillard terms the end of the social, at least as metaphysical reserve, and where 
"dialogue" is not a flaccid Buberism or hermeneutic pretext, but what marks 
an agonistic field in the absence of a trope of "communication" that is the 
most reified of all. Such might seem a worthy heir of the great slavic theo-
rists, for whom formalist concepts marked radical interventions rather than 
safe redundancies. 
New School for Social Research Thomas D. Cohen 
